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ABSTRACT
This thesis is ultimately concerned with the relationship between education and 
democracy. By taking up the work of two theorists, Jurgen Habermas and Paulo Freire, 
this thesis takes education and democracy to each be specialized communications 
procedures which have an impact upon each other. By taking up the work of Habermas, I 
am able to present a specific theory of communication which demonstrates the internal 
relationship between communication and democracy, and which proposes a theory of 
social action and co-ordination based on the processes of communication. By taking up 
Freire’s work, I am able to present a model of education which is specifically concerned 
with emancipation and is grounded in the process of dialogue. This thesis draws out 
some of the specific parallels between the respective works of these theorists, and argues 
that by combining the efforts of the two, it is possible to propose an understanding of 
education as a process which has important implication for the possibility of democracy.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Nothing in education is so astonishing as the amount of ignorance it accumulates in the 
form of inert facts.
-Henry Brooks Adams
And just because you have colleges and universities, doesn’t mean you have education. 
The colleges and universities in the American educational system are skilfully used to 
miseducate.
-Malcolm X
It can be argued that through the dimension of ‘literacy,’ education has its most 
important impact upon society. Without the literacy skills or competencies to understand 
and interpret our society, and the social structures on which we exist, it is impossible to 
actively contribute to them, or, indeed, to change them. Such a connection becomes 
particularly important to our society since we describe it as a democracy. As a 
democracy, our society is dependent upon the people for its constitution, for its 
governance, for its organization generally. If, however, the people who comprise a 
‘democratic’ society do not actually affect its constitution, its governance, or its general 
organization, then that society cannot in fact be a legitimate democracy. And while there 
are many possible reasons for the people to be ineffective in this activity of democratic 
legitimation, an ‘illiterate’ public would certainly constitute a clear and central limitation 
on such activity. In other words, an educated public is a requisite for a legitimately 
functioning democracy.
However, education and democracy are also linked at a more fundamental level, 
through the activity of communication. Education and democracy can both be 
characterized as specialized communication procedures; that is, at the centre of both 
education and democracy is the form of communicative interactional procedure that is
1
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characteristic of each institution. It is the fundamental activity of communication that 
specifically characterizes the practices of education and democracy, that governs the 
processes of education and democracy. By adopting the study of these fundamental 
communicative procedures as my entry point into the relationship between education and 
democracy, I intend to argue that the communicative procedures of both education and 
democracy significantly overlap, and that this overlap demonstrates not only the 
fundamental relationship between education and democracy, but also the important 
implications of the process of education for the possibility of a democratic society. I will 
argue, that is, that close attention to the communicative dimensions of a critical theory 
and practice of education can demonstrate with renewed force the contemporary 
importance of education to the project of democratization.
In order to justify this claim concerning the communicative link between 
education and democracy, I should first turn to a discussion concerning my usage and 
context of the terms ‘education’ and ‘democracy.’ Turning first to the notion of 
education, one quickly realizes that defining the notion of ‘education,’ in spite of the 
widespread recognition of its importance, is a difficult endeavour. Education can be 
variously understood as a technical skill (as it is understood in the process of teacher 
training), a personal state (as in an educated individual), a social institution (reflected by 
discourses of literate populations and literacy rates), or a interactive procedure (the 
teaching-learning process of the classroom), among others. However, it is a generally 
accepted assumption in all of these usages that ‘education’ has positive normative 
implications, that education is valuable, that it is an investment, a worthwhile endeavour.1 
Throughout this thesis, I will be adopting a similar normative interpretation of
2
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‘education,’ but also employing the term specifically in the sense of an interactive and 
communicative process, focusing particularly on the micro-social and interactional 
dimensions of education. Hence, in my discussion of education, I will chiefly be 
concerned with the process and practice of education.
My inquiry into the process of education is also concerned with situating this 
discussion within a specific social context. While education has remained an important 
social practice throughout history, in this thesis, I will be concerned with education in the 
framework of modem society, and specifically in the context of (the possibility of) 
modem democracy. Since the transition from pre-modem, traditional society, governed 
according to, variously, logics of religion, tradition, superstition, or community (Tonnies’ 
Gemeinschaft), modernism emerged as a social organization characterized by individuals 
(particularly with their own consciousnesses and rights), the paradigm of the subject, 
private property, the division of labour and increased specialization, a system of law, the 
separation of the spheres of public, private, state, religion, etc., and rationality. Within 
this context of modernity, and the Enlightenment project of rationality, philosophical 
questions of rights, legitimacy, justification, and liberty emerged; the institutions of the 
state came into question, and the pre-modem systems of monarchy and notions of 
divinely sanctioned governance were challenged. As a result of the transition to 
modernity, society was re-organized through this emergent logic of rationality and in a
1 See Barrow and Woods (1982:9-12).
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system of law, and the modem constitutional state was created. In this context, (modem) 
democratic self-governance emerged as a realizable possibility.
This context is obviously also important to how I will situate my discussion of the 
notion of ‘democracy.’ Modem democracy, conceived of through rationality, law, and an 
understanding of individual consciousness and right, can be seen as the modem ideal of 
self-governance. Any definition of democracy, however, is as contested as any 
understanding of education; while broadly conceived of in terms of self-govemance, 
many variations of the democratic ideal exist. Representative democracy, participatory 
democracy, social democracy, democratic capitalism, and the existence of various other 
‘democracies’ demonstrates the difficulty in realizing this ideal. As the modem era has 
continued, the question of the possibility of democracy, and the dilemmas entailed in 
realizing an authentically emancipatory social system of self-govemance, have become 
fundamental concerns. At least since Weber’s ‘iron cage’ of rationality, and continuing 
in Adorno and Horkheimer’s concept, in The Dialectic o f Enlightenment, of ‘instrumental 
rationality,’ the perpetual crises of modernity and the paradox of the simultaneously 
emancipatory and oppressive quality of modem rationality has cast serious doubt upon 
the possibility of emancipation in the project of modernity.
It is particularly in the dilemma of democracy that this paradox of modernity is 
revealed. While the possibility of a self-governing social system is only properly
2 For various discussions on the transition to modernity see, “Modernity” in Macey (2000), Kellner’s 
discussion o f Critical Theory and Modernity (1989:3-9), and Dallmayr (1997). The two theorists o f  central 
importance to Critical Theory and its understanding of the transition to modernity are Hegel (particularly 
his theories of subjectivity and civil society) and Weber (particularly his theory o f rationalization).
3 1 have used this term at various points throughout this thesis to describe various social activities. Since 
this is somewhat o f  a controversial term, I should explain my usage o f it. By “authentically” I mean to say 
that something has been grounded procedurally in agreements achieved through the process o f dialogue.
For example, authentic democracy is that form o f democracy agreed upon through the process o f dialogue; 
it is grounded procedurally in the agreements achieved through dialogue.
4
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realizable with the emergence, in modernity, of a civil society, the rationalization process 
at the heart of the transition from pre-modern to modem has thrown up various 
philosophical obstacles to the problem of emancipation. Horkheimer and Adomo, in 
particular, claim that the possibility of emancipation through ‘instrumental rationality,’ 
and its associated quality of objectification, as the philosophical engine of reason that 
they identify at the core of modernity, is impossible. That is, instrumental rationality, 
confined to a subjectivist paradigm, is only able to treat social processes in a subject- 
object dialectic in which people will necessarily objectify others, and therefore is unable 
to provide a foundation for an intersubjective paradigm that has an emancipatory intent. 
As such, while modernity has afforded us the possibility of understanding and justifying 
social organizations and rules on the basis of reason, it will irrevocably fall into tyranny, 
exploitation and oppression as a result of the fundamental instrumentality of rationality. 
It is not until Habermas (at least in the tradition of German Critical Theory) that the 
possibility of a solution to this paradox is presented, and a way out of the dilemma of 
democracy is proposed. Habermas contends that by limiting our understanding of 
rationality to its instrumental form, we have cut short the project of modernity, and that it 
is this move that explains how the emancipatory potential of this project has been short- 
circuited within critical thought.
It is also in this context of transition that another of the central philosophical 
dilemmas of modernity emerges, namely that of its (sometimes) foundationalist 
metaphysical approach. Particularly evident in the attempt to ground the project of 
critical modernity in a subject-oriented, metaphysical foundation, this dilemma has 
proved to be one of the central problems with modem critical thought. By adopting a
5
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subject-oriented metaphysical approach to the project of modernity, critical theory has 
been unable to generate a normative foundation from which to propose its critique of 
capitalist modernization. Such a metaphysical approach is affected directly by the 
problems of its proposed universality. That is, using a metaphysical foundation, critical 
theory faces the dilemma of proving a universal principle that is not simply cultural 
relative, or an expression of ‘Western cultural values’ imposed upon all other forms of 
society. This is also one of the specific dilemmas of modernity that Habermas is 
interested in resolving with his critical theory.
It is in this context of modem society, the dilemma of democracy, and the paradox 
of modernity that I wish to situate my discussion concerning the communicative link 
between education and democracy and I will return to a fuller explication of these 
contextual issues below. Specifically, I take up this relationship between education and 
democracy through the work of two specific theorists: Paulo Freire and Jurgen Habermas. 
Among the most original critical approaches to the relationship between education and 
democracy is ‘critical pedagogy,’ first formally introduced and articulated as a theory and 
practice of education by Freire, a Brazilian educator and theorist. Particularly during the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, Freire produced works that articulated his theory and practice 
of critical pedagogy, and until his death in 1997, continued to refine his articulation and 
practice of this theory. The German philosopher Jurgen Habermas, while not explicitly 
dealing with the question of education or the relationship between education and 
democracy, has been centrally concerned with processes of modernization, and with the 
dilemma of the possibility of democracy in modern society. Through the development of 
his theory of communicative action, and his unique articulation of the problematic of
6
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ethical discourse, Habermas has contributed significantly to understanding processes of 
modernization and rationalization, as well as (the possibility of) democratic society. 
Since the 1960s, Habermas’s theoretical work has made a major impression on a host of 
other scholars, academic disciplines, and fields of thought4; however, he is (relatively) 
only rarely cited in the context of educational theory5, and even less frequently alongside 
the work of Freire.6 Some recent works have explored the general importance of their 
theories to each other, but none has explicitly addressed the relationship between 
education and the dilemma of modem democracy, its ‘rationality’ problem, or the 
possibility of education functioning as a democratizing force in society, an approach that 
holds, I will argue, great explanatory potential for extending the applicability of both.
By taking up the works of these two theorists, I will argue that the communicative 
dimension in each of their work is the central moment of this relationship between 
education and democracy, and I will argue that the practice of education has important 
implications for modern democratic society and the real possibility for legitimate 
democracy. Specifically I will draw from these two theorists because of the importance 
each places on the process of communication. For Freire, whose critical pedagogy is one 
of the best known critical models of education, communication and dialogue are central 
to the process of education, and the quality and characteristics of communication and 
dialogue are objects of investigation that directly affect the quality of education. For
4 “There is scarcely an area o f the humanities or social sciences that has not felt the influence o f his 
thought; he is master, in breadth and depth alike, o f a wide range o f specialized literatures... [including] 
philosophy and psychology, political science and sociology, the history o f ideas and social theory” 
(McCarthy, 1978:ix).
5 A few relatively recent works have begun to examine the importance of Habermas’s thought for 
education; some examples include Masschelein (1991), Welton (1995,2001), Siljander (1989), Terry 
(1997), Young (1990), and Papastephanou (1999).
6 1 have only found two significant sources which have undertaken such a comparative study, Morrow and 
Torres (2002), and Plumb (1989).
7
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Habermas, communication forms the very basis of his critical social theory, and it is 
those activities of communication which affect the coordination of social organization 
and action. By taking up the work of these two theorists, and making a theoretical 
connection between their theories of communication, I will argue that it is possible to 
‘reconstruct’7 Freire’s critical pedagogy using Habermas’s critical theory, thereby 
arguing that there exists a fundamental communicative link between education and 
democracy, and that there are important implications in the process of education for the 
possibility of democratic society.
Specifically, this thesis finds, in taking up the work of Freire and Habermas, that 
their work can be connected at three central moments: through the parallel between their 
respective notions of praxis and pragmatics, through their methodologies of generative 
themes and reconstructive science, and through the concepts of cultural action for 
freedom and communicative action. These three central parallels between their work also 
serves to support the claim of this thesis concerning the central moment of connection 
through dialogue or communication. These deep connections, particularly that of 
dialogue/communication, between Freire’s and Habermas’s work demonstrate the 
moments of similarity between their theoretical projects, and, through the central moment 
of dialogue, allow for the opportunity to reconstruct Freire’s project through Habermas.
o
This reconstruction resolves the foundationalist problems in Freire’s work, and shift his 
concept of dialogue from a method to the central moment of his project. It also allows 
Freire’s work to be used to extend Habermas’s theory of communicative action,
7 1 will take up a detailed discussion o f this concept of reconstruction in the following chapter since it is the 
central methodology o f Habermas’s critical theory.
8 By “foundationalist problems” I am concerned with addressing Freire’s subject-centred reason as a failure 
to fully thematize intersubjectivity. I will deal specifically with this issue in the last chapter o f this thesis.
8
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demonstrating the importance of critical pedagogy as an interactional procedure to the 
possibility of democracy.
Let me turn now to a discussion of Freire’s critical pedagogy, noting its specific 
orientation to emancipation and democracy, followed by a discussion of Habermas’s 
critical theory of society, focusing on his theory of communicative action and his 
program of formal pragmatics.
Critical Pedagogy
Critical pedagogy can loosely be understood as a philosophy and practice of 
education, although in its initial conception, and through the work of various 
commentators since (including McLaren, Giroux, Aronowitz, and Shor), it has also more 
broadly been taken to be a critical theory of society.9’10 Since the 1970s, it has emerged 
as the most significant critical theory of education, and continues to inform the theory 
and practice of critical education. The original theory of critical pedagogy was developed 
in the work of the Brazilian educator and philosopher Paulo Freire. While various 
thinkers and philosophers before Freire dealt with the importance and centrality of the 
processes of education in social organization11, none had linked such a critical 
understanding of education and social transformation with a microscopic examination of 
interaction in educational settings. As a result, the many theorists since Freire that have 
taken up this project of critical pedagogy and have similarly engaged in critically
9 See, for example, the discussion o f critical pedagogy in McLaren, 1989:159-165.
10 Another important work that deals with critical models o f education is Giroux’s Theory and Resistance in 
Education. This text is centrally concerned with demonstrating the importance of critical theory to 
education and democracy. I have not taken up this text, however, because Giroux does not deal with 
Habermas in his discussion o f critical theory, nor does he specifically focus on the centrality o f the process 
of communication in this work, two themes that are central to this thesis.
11 Many thinkers through history have dealt with this question, from Socrates to Rousseau to Dewey.
9
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theorizing educational philosophy and practice continue to owe (and acknowledge) their 
critiques and formulations to the foundational work provided by Freire.
Arguably, Freire’s most important work was Pedagogy o f the Oppressed. 
Translated and published in English in the early 1970s, the appearance of this small 
volume dramatically changed the face of the philosophy of education. In this book, 
Freire lays out the philosophical project of critical pedagogy, describing and unfolding 
his critical theory of society and the possibility of social transformation. While Freire 
expanded upon this initial exposition throughout the rest of his life, much of his later 
work is largely concerned with re-articulating and refining the concepts and theories 
originally formulated and described in Pedagogy o f the Oppressed. Drawing largely 
from this source, but also from some of Freire’s later articulations, as well as from some 
of the commentary on Freire’s theory, this brief description will seek to explicate Freire’s 
model of critical pedagogy.
Freire’s project of critical pedagogy, and the theory which arose from it, was 
specifically couched in Freire’s experiences as an educator in his native Brazil. Aware of 
the oppression and destitution of many people, in Brazil and beyond, Freire’s project is 
fundamentally emancipatory. As such, he proposes critical pedagogy as a theory and 
practice that embraces the reality of the oppressed and seeks, through a process of 
dialogue and learning about reality, to liberate humanity from the practices of oppression. 
This is the initial point from which Freire develops his theory of critical pedagogy, that 
“the problem of humanization has always...been man’s [sic] central problem” (Freire, 
1972:27). Freire contends that “while both humanization and dehumanization are real 
alternatives, only the first is man’s [sic] vocation” (1972:28).
10
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Freire justifies his argument of humanization and oppression through a theory of 
ontology.12 He argues that humans exist in the world, “as the only [being] to treat not 
only his actions but his very self as the object of his reflection” (1972:87). In Freire’s 
conception, humanity is distinguished by our ability as humans to be conscious of 
ourselves and the world in which we exist, separating the two; and as such, able to 
consciously affect change in the objective world around us (with reflexive effects on 
ourselves). Our transformation of the world is not simply an instinctual practice, but a 
praxical one, in which we reflect and act upon the world. To act upon the world without 
reflection is to exist objectively as part of the world, to exist as animals do (Freire, 
1970:206). To simply reflect upon the world is to exist subjectively, to exist outside of 
the world, to deny the conditions of reality or the possibility of affecting them.
The process and practice of oppression grows out of treating humanity as part of 
the objective world rather than recognizing other humans as equal ‘praxical’ subjects, 
able to reflect upon and affect the external objective world in which humanity stands out. 
As such, the practice of oppression is dehumanizing, and prevents humanity from 
realizing its true vocation. Through the process of oppression, both the oppressed and the 
oppressor are dehumanized. By dehumanizing the oppressed, the oppressor acts so as to 
deny the human capacity of praxis in the oppressed, and as such, fails to recognize the 
true vocation of all humanity, the praxical transformation of the world by all humanity. 
Because of this implicit denial of humanization in the act of oppression, only the 
oppressed offer the possibility of realizing the true vocation of humanity. Since humanity 
exists praxically, both acting and reflecting to transform the world, only the oppressed,
12 This explication and framework o f analysis o f Freire’s work is largely inspired by the approach provided 
in Morrow and Torres (2002), and Plumb (1989). Also, Freire’s ontological perspective is distinctly
11
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who because of their oppression seek to transform the world, possess the ability to 
address the problem of humanization. The oppressors, seeking to preserve the world as it 
exists so that they may maintain their dominance rather than acting praxically to 
transform the world, are unable to address this problem.13
Freire’s emancipatory project of critical pedagogy is approached through the 
process of education and the development of literacy. Freire couches his emancipatory 
project in these processes as an outcome of his understanding of the importance of 
communication in the process of praxis. “To exist, humanly, is to name the world, to 
change it... But while to say the true word—which is work, which is praxis—is to 
transform the world...no one can say a true word alone... Dialogue is the encounter 
between men [sic], mediated by the world, in order to name the world” (Freire, 1972:76). 
Literacy and education are not simply processes of learning, they are vital to learning the 
praxical nature of humanity. Students are led to realize that to name the world is to 
praxically affect the world, to reflect and act upon the world in order to transform it. As a 
result, ‘education,’ particularly as the term is used in critical pedagogy, is not simply a 
process confined to the classroom or the school. Rather, education and literacy are 
processes through which the oppressed can both become aware of the praxical nature of 
humanity and realize that this praxical nature can reside in every activity in which we 
humanly engage.
Freire specifically draws out his project of critical pedagogy by initially 
criticizing existing educational and literacy programs employing the so-called ‘banking 
method,’ and by proposing an alternative model of education which dialogically engages
Marxian (See, McLaren and Leonard, 1993:3).
12
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the participants. Freire’s critique of the banking method addresses its objectification of
students, and its reification of the teacher-student relationship. The banking method
assumes the teacher as the authority and source of knowledge, and the students as the
passive vessels in which this knowledge is invested. As Freire describes it,
In the banking concept of education, knowledge is a gift bestowed by those who 
consider themselves knowledgeable upon those who they consider to know 
nothing. Projecting an absolute ignorance onto others, a characteristic of the 
ideology of oppression, negates education and knowledge as processes of inquiry. 
The teacher presents himself to his students as their necessary opposite; by 
considering their ignorance absolute, he justifies his own existence...banking 
education...mirror[s] oppressive society as a whole. (Freire, 1972:58-9)
Clearly, such an approach to education and literacy exemplifies oppression and the
problem of dehumanization.
As an alternative to this oppressive and dehumanizing approach to education and
literacy, Freire proposes his theory and practice of critical pedagogy. As opposed to the
banking method, critical pedagogy explicitly recognizes the dialogical nature of
education. Critical pedagogy is “a pedagogy which must be forged with, not for, the
oppressed...in their incessant struggle to regain their humanity” (Freire, 1972:33).
Critical pedagogy is not objectifying in its methodology, but dialogic, forged with the
oppressed, in a interactive engagement with humanity. It also does not claim objectivity,
since it does not objectify its students, and it recognizes that education is political, that it
cannot be conducted in “a political, social, economic and cultural vacuum” (Scatamburlo,
1994:34). Freire openly claims that his project of critical pedagogy is political, since all
education is political, “that the whole activity o f education is political in nature'” (Shor,
1993:27). And particularly, critical pedagogy is praxical; it seeks “for theory to embrace
13 This discussion o f humanization/dehumanization and oppressed/oppressor is drawn from the first chapter 
o f Freire’ Pedagogy o f  the Oppressed (1972).
13
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everyday living” (Shor and Freire, 1987:3). The practice and process of critical 
pedagogy, unlike the banking method, uses the activities of quotidian life as objects of 
reflection, joining the processes of reflection and action, so that through the process of 
education, students may begin to realize the praxical nature of human existence. 
“Literacy then becomes a global task involving illiterate learners in their relationship with 
the world and others...in understanding this...learners contribute to their own ability to 
take charge as the actors of the task—the praxis” (Freire, 1985:14). As the students of 
critical pedagogy become engaged in this process, become literate and aware of the 
praxical capacity of their humanity, they can begin to realize the possibility of 
transformation and hope for a better human existence.
Essentially, this is Freire’s philosophy of critical pedagogy. Starting from the 
problem of dehumanization and a theory of ontology, Freire argues that humanity is 
fundamentally praxical, and that through the theory and practice of critical pedagogy, the 
oppressed can begin to realize their own praxical nature, and through this, begin to 
transform their world. Freire’s project is specifically one of liberation, and his vision is 
driven by hope—“hope is a natural, possible, and necessary impetus in the context of our 
unfinishedness” (Freire, 1998:69). The project of critical pedagogy is concerned with 
demonstrating the oppressive nature of deterministic and fatalistic understandings of 
humanity and the world. Through the praxical nature of humanity, we have the hope of 
transforming our world.
14
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Communicative Action (and Formal Pragmatics)
While Freire’s work is centrally concerned with education, and the effects of
literacy upon oppressed society and its emancipatory potential, Habermas’s work is
initially a much broader critical theory of society that ultimately focuses upon the much
narrower phenomenon of communication to examine the democratic possibility of
modem society. Following the tradition of the German Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School, Habermas is concerned with the paradox of rationality in modem society, the
possibility of democracy, and the apparent failure of the project of modernity. What sets
Habermas apart from his predecessors at the Frankfurt School is his distinction between
instmmental or strategic rationality and communicative rationality, and his use of
linguistically mediated communication as the foundation of his critical social theory.
Taking up Marx’s concept of ‘sensuous human activity’ as the foundation of social
organization and coordination, Habermas identifies two separate components,
...which, though interdependent in social practice, are nevertheless analytically 
distinguishable and mutually irreducible: labor or purposive-rational action, and 
social interaction or communicative action... Only on the basis of a distinction 
between work according to technical rules and interaction according to valid 
norms can we reconstruct the development of the human species as a historical 
process. (McCarthy, 1978:22)
Habermas contends that it is in the realm of social interaction that a theory of social
evolution and a critical theory of society can be founded. Using such an entry point,
Habermas sets up for himself an examination of the activity of social interaction or
communicative action through communication, and specifically through communication-
in-use, or the activity of speech. This examination is largely undertaken through his
project of formal pragmatics.
15
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Habermas’s program of formal (initially ‘universal’) pragmatics forms the basis 
of his theory of communicative action, which in turn provides the central pillar of his 
critical theory of society. “The task of universal pragmatics is to identify and reconstruct 
universal conditions of possible mutual understanding... as language is the specific 
medium of understanding...! want to...single out explicit speech actions from other 
forms of communicative action” (Habermas, 1979:1). I will take up formal pragmatics 
more specifically in the following chapter, but in order to understand both this very 
specific theory of communication and Habermas’s greater critical theory of society, it 
will be useful to briefly discuss his theory of communicative action which forms the 
centre piece of Habermas’s work. This discussion of the theory of communicative action 
will also touch on aspects of the program of formal pragmatics.
Habermas’s theory of communicative action is an attempt to distinguish 
between different forms of rationally coordinated social action through the form of 
communication that characterizes, organizes, and directs subsequent action. He proposes 
a “theory of communication... [that] could be made fruitful for a sociological theory of 
action... [to] show how communicative acts... take on the function of coordinating action 
and make their contribution to building up interactions” (Habermas, 1984:278).
Habermas contends that there are essentially two forms of socially coordinated 
action, communicative action, and strategic action.14 Communicative action is that action 
which is oriented toward reaching understanding. Strategic action is that action which is 
oriented towards achieving an end, which is purposive. In the communicative process 
through which any action has been coordinated, one can analytically distinguish each of
16
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these two action forms. If the communication follows strategic purposive rationality, the 
subsequent action will be strategic. If the communication that coordinates the action 
follows communicative rationality, then the ensuing action can be described as 
communicative.
Fundamental to this formulation is the argument that “reaching understanding is 
the inherent telos of human speech... [that] an orientation to reaching understanding is the 
original mode of language use” (Habermas, 1984:287, 288). In order to advance this 
argument, Habermas adopts Austin’s pragmatic distinction between the performance of 
locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts in any speech act.15 A speaker 
performs a locutionary act by expressing a state of affairs, by saying something. An 
illocutionary act is achieved by the speaker performing an action in saying something. In 
an utterance, a speaker promises, commands, directs, threatens, etc., and such action (in 
the speech act itself, as a part of it) is described as illocutionary. A perlocutionary act is 
performed when the speaker produces an effect upon the hearer, when the speaker brings 
about something in the world. In other words, in any speech act, a speaker says 
something [locutionary], acts in saying something [illocutionary], and brings about 
something through acting in saying something [perlocutionary] (Habermas, 1984:288-9).
Habermas argues, through the differentiation of illocutionary and perlocutionary 
aims in any speech act, that when a speaker pursues illocutionary aims, she is pursuing an 
aim that is explicitly and internally related to the speech act itself. He argues that the 
illocutionary aims of a speech act are, as such, self-identifying (1984:290-2).
14 A third form o f action can be analytically differentiated, namely, instrumental action. The distinction
between strategic and instrumental action is that, while both are oriented toward success (actors’ goals),
strategic action is achieved through social interaction; instrumental action is not. See Habermas, 1984:285.
17
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Perlocutionary aims, on the other hand, are external to what is being said, and not openly
disclosed through the speech act; they cannot be admitted to, and can only be identified
through the speaker’s intention (Habermas, 1984:290-2).16 Habermas employs this
distinction in support of his claim that language is inherently oriented towards reaching
understanding, by showing that the illocutionary act is the only element necessary to the
performance of a speech act. On this basis, he further develops his distinction between
communicative and strategic action.
Thus I count as communicative action those linguistically mediated interactions in 
which all participants pursue illocutionary aims, and only illocutionary aims, with 
their mediating acts of communication. On the other hand, I regard as 
linguistically mediated strategic action those interactions in which at least one of 
the participants wants with his speech acts to produce perlocutionary effects on 
his opposite number. (Habermas, 1984:295)
While this distinction between the illocutionary and perlocutionary aims of a speech act 
serve as a useful argument supporting the distinction between strategic and 
communicative action, Habermas also develops within the theory of communicative 
action the concept of validity claims to further delineate communicative from strategic 
actions coordinated through communication, and to link language use to communicative 
competence, which is specifically a feature of formal pragmatics (again to be taken up in 
more detail later). Habermas proposes that in any utterance, it is possible to analytically
15 Habermas’s treatment o f Austin also forms an important part o f his program o f formal pragmatics, to be 
taken up again later.
16 This distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary aims may best be demonstrated with an 
example. If a teacher says to a student: “I’m thirsty. Please get me a glass o f  water” the illocutionary aim 
o f the speech act is the teacher’s directive to the student to get a glass o f water (that is, the teacher is 
requesting or instructing the student to do something). The perlocutionary aim, however, since it is not
implicit to the speech act, could be one of several. The teacher may, perhaps, want the student to leave the 
room so that the class can talk about that student without the student’s knowledge. Since such an aim is not 
explicit in the speech act, it can only be identified through the teacher’s intention (or possibly revealed by 
subsequent actions). The locutionary act o f the teacher’s utterance is the statement expressing the teacher’s 
thirst.
18
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identify three different possible validity claims at work: 1) a claim to normative rightness, 
2) a claim to truth, and 3) a claim to truthfulness or sincerity (1984:306). Claims of 
normative rightness refer to the level of inter subjective relationship between speakers and 
hearers; claims of truth refer to the objective world of shared knowledge; and truthfulness 
or sincerity claims refer to the internal subjectivity of the speaker, that she is expressing 
herself truthfully. In any utterance, each of these validity claims is potentially raised, 
although any specific utterance tends to thematize or problematize a specific validity 
claim. “The illocutionary role [of the utterance].. .determines the aspect of validity under 
which the speaker wants his utterance to be understood first and foremost'’ (Habermas, 
1984:308). When a validity claim is raised or thematized, it can be redeemed “in turn 
through the functions of achieving understanding in language” (Habermas, 1984:308). 
Using this formulation of the procedures of language use and communication, we can 
conclude that linguistically mediated communicative action is achieved through the 
redemption (or defeat) of a thematized validity claim. Strategic action, on the other hand, 
is achieved when action is coordinated without the redemption of the validity-claim to 
which the utterance is oriented. Such action coordination can include an action based 
upon previously agreed upon successful communicative action, such as the agreement on 
norms which have been established to govern the actions of the participants (as in a 
game, for example). Strategic action can be understood as action which is coordinated 
without the communicative process, but does not necessarily preclude the justification of 
such action.
Habermas’s theory of communicative action, then is based largely upon his 
program of formal pragmatics, and proposes a theory of social action that emphasizes the
19
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communicative dimension of social interaction, organization, and coordination. It 
presents important implications for critical theory, and does indeed form the centre piece 
of his critical theory of society. Through this program of formal pragmatics and the 
theory of communicative action, Habermas proposes an understanding of society which 
presents the possibility of legitimate democracy through the practices of everyday speech. 
It proposes the possibility of ethically evaluating the normative validity of the 
institutional structures which organize our society, and evaluating social norms 
themselves.17 As such, Habermas’s program of formal pragmatics presents a very useful 
theory of communication, and a powerful directive for the possibility of democracy.
Freire/Habermas—Communication—Education/Democracy
Clearly, the work of both Freire and Habermas is concerned with communication, 
as well as the problem and the possibility of democracy. Where they do not clearly or 
explicitly overlap is on the practice and process of education, and this is the link I wish to 
draw in this thesis. Using Freire’s model of critical pedagogy as a theory and practice of 
critical education, this thesis argues that such a model of education has important 
implications for the possibility of democratic society. The fundamental communicative 
link between education and democracy will serve as the specific hinge upon which this 
argument swings. Using Freire’s recognition of the importance of dialogue in education 
as an entry point, it is possible to demonstrate how Habermas’s program of formal 
pragmatics not only complements and fills out Freire’s work, but also explicitly connects
17 The ethics o f norms is largely taken up in Habermas’s later theoretical work dealing with discourse
ethics. This aspect o f his critical theory of society is concerned with the ethical evaluation o f discourse,
and provides another dimension to his program o f formal pragmatics, namely an expression of formal 
pragmatics in moral philosophy.
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it to the modem critical project of building an authentically democratic society. In other 
words, this thesis argues that it is possible to reconstruct Freire’s critical pedagogy using 
Habermas’s program of formal pragmatics and theory of communicative action. The 
result is to propose an understanding of education as an emancipatory communicative 
practice, by extending Habermas’s theory of communicative action using a reconstructed 
Freirean critical pedagogy. This thesis shows, then, how the interactional dimension of 
critical pedagogy contributes to a model for the procedure of democracy.
At this point, it will be useful to review some of the literature which has 
specifically dealt with the possible synthesis of Freire and Habermas. I have found only 
two sustained comparative treatments of Freire and Habermas. The first is Donovan 
Plumb’s M.A. thesis from 1989. This work is primarily concerned with demonstrating 
the significance of Habermas’s work to Freire’s model of critical pedagogy by arguing 
that Habermas’s distinction between communicative and instrumental rationality (in his 
theory of communicative action) “addresses the principal shortcomings of Freire’s 
attempt to provide rational grounds for his pedagogy” (Plumb, i). One of the principal 
problems identified in this thesis with Freire’s model of critical pedagogy is Freire’s 
attempt to emphasize the importance of dialogue in his model while still relying on a 
subject-oriented paradigm (Plumb, 65). Plumb contends that “reworking the foundations 
of Freire’s pedagogy in terms of Habermas’s theory of communicative action... serves to 
integrate dialogue into the center of his pedagogical theory” (Plumb, 65).
The second significant comparative treatment of Freire and Habermas is Morrow 
and Torres’s work Reading Freire and Habermas (2002). In this book, the authors take 
up a detailed comparison of the work of Freire and Habermas, arguing that not only can
21
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their separate works be reconciled, but that they complement each other: “we attempt to 
develop a comparison of these two theorists, stressing the complementarity of their 
approaches, despite significant differences in focus and style” (Morrow and Torres, ix). 
This text is, however, largely concerned with how such a complementary comparison can 
create new openings for critical theory of education. While noting the explicit and 
implicit arguments concerning education and democracy present in each theorist’s work, 
and in their connections, Morrow and Torres are not specifically concerned with 
elucidating this relationship, but rather, attempting through this comparison to present 
some new insights into critical educational theory.
These two texts are, as previously stated, the only significant and sustained 
comparative treatments of Freire and Habermas to date. This thesis also attempts to 
maintain a sustained comparison of the work of these two theorists, and draws at different 
points from these two texts. However, this thesis differs in a number of important 
aspects. First, as opposed to Plumb’s work, I am attempting to incorporate Freire into 
Habermas, not Habermas into Freire, as he has done. Second, in contrast to Morrow and 
Torres’ work, I am concerned with an argument about education and democracy, and the 
specific link between these two social processes, as opposed to seeking only to contribute 
to critical educational theory. And finally, the connection made between these two 
thinkers is focused specifically on the communicative dimension of their works, and how 
through this communicative link, it is possible to use Freire’s model of critical pedagogy 
to extend Habermas’s critical theory, and that such a communicatively-focused linkage 
affects important practical implications concerning the relationship between education 
and democracy: a communicatively oriented (critical) model of education (such as
22
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Freire’s) in fact constitutes an essential component of the modem project of 
democratization.
To this end, my argument is be addressed accordingly in the following chapters:
Chapter Two presents, in his own specific and theoretical vocabulary, a more 
detailed description and analysis of Habermas’s program of formal pragmatics and his 
theory of communicative action. In this chapter, I am specifically concerned with 
Habermas’s arguments concerning language as the most direct medium for achieving 
mutual understanding, and as such am concerned with his theory of communicative 
action only and its relation to his program of formal pragmatics. This description 
emphasizes the corrective Habermas’s critical theory provides to previous modernist 
critical theory, and how, based on a theory of communication, Habermas is able to 
propose a model of democratic procedure. Since my discussion is particularly interested 
in showing how social action is coordinated through linguistically mediated 
communication, I only focus on the micro-social and interactional dimension of 
Habermas’s critical theory of society (as opposed to the macro-social and institutional 
aspects of his theory). This chapter is also written with questions in mind about how 
Habermas’s critical project could be theoretically expanded to deal with the process of 
education.
Chapter Three is a description and analysis of Freire’s model of critical pedagogy, 
explaining how Freire conceives of society, emancipation, and the role of education and 
literacy in the possibility of transformative social change, also using Freire’s own 
vocabulary. In describing and analysing Freire’s critical pedagogy, I am particularly 
concerned with his concept of dialogue, and the important role it plays in fulfilling his
23
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pedagogical project. This description deals with Freire’s goal of emancipation and social 
(and individual) transformation through praxis, which he contends is immediately evident 
in the process of dialogue.
Finally, Chapter Four will seek to draw the work of these two theorists together in 
a discussion of the different ‘parallels’ and ‘gaps’ that it is possible to identify in their 
work, bringing together their specific vocabularies to present the linkages between them. 
By demonstrating the deep connections between their theoretical projects, I argue that 
their work is complementary and parallel. By taking the moment of dialogue and 
communication as a central intersection, I also argue that their respective theories provide 
important contributions to the other, that each can be used to fill the ‘gaps’ in each others 
work. The conclusion of this thesis is, then, that Habermas and Freire share parallel goals 
and processes in their complementary theoretical projects, that Habermas can be used to 
reconstruct Freire’s critical pedagogy, and that Freire’s critical pedagogy can be proposed 
as an extension of Habermas’s theory of communicative action. Such a reconstruction 
and extension, finally, places the process of education as an important moment in the 
possibility of democratic society.
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Chapter 2: The Critical Communicative Theory of Jurgen Habermas
Since this thesis is concerned, in the final instance, with communication, it will be 
necessary to take up a theory of communication that effectively makes the link I am 
arguing in this thesis. That is, how does communication affect social interaction, and 
how does communication serve as a link between different forms of social interaction? 
Can we distinguish between different communicative practices in such a way so as to 
demonstrate the democratic potential of certain social interactions over others? Is there a 
necessary link between the practices of communication in social interaction and the 
practice of democracy, that is, is there an internal link between communication and 
democracy? All these questions are important in the argument I am developing with this 
thesis, namely that education and democracy, as social interactions governed by certain 
communicative practices, have important congruencies, and that certain models of 
education, based on certain communicative practices, do have important implications for 
the possibility of democracy.
In order to take up this argument, I will first need to present a description and 
discussion of the work of Jurgen Habermas. Habermas’s theories will occupy my 
attention for the purposes of providing a theory of communication and communicative 
practices which address the concerns raised by the questions above. It serves an 
important function in this argument because of the centrality it places on the process of 
communication in social interaction and social organization. It is also particularly 
important because it explicitly makes a link between this dimension of micro-social
25
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interaction and the macro-social level of institutions, tracking a trajectory from 
communication to democratic society.
My treatment of Habermas will begin with a brief description of critical theory 
generally, and the problems of critical theories of modernity. Habermas’s work is a 
direct response to these problems, and is inspired by a deeply serious attempt to rescue 
critical modernity from its metaphysical impositions18, to save it from its defeatism, and 
to pursue the ‘unfinished project of modernity’ by proposing a post-metaphysical yet 
non-defeatist critical theory of society. Such a program is initially described by his 
program of formal pragmatics, which forms Habermas’s understanding of language-in- 
use. Working with these discussions of language-in-use, Habermas develops his theories 
of communicative rationality and action, which are the basis of his critical theory of 
society. Returning to elements of his program of formal pragmatics, Habermas develops 
his theory of ethical discourse, which, when brought together with his communicatively- 
oriented critical theory of society, forms the basis of his arguments concerning the 
possibility of democratic society. Let me turn first, then, to a discussion of Habermas’s 
place in critical theories of modernity.
Critical Modernity
As stated in the previous chapter, this thesis is concerned with situating my 
argument within the context of modernity. Specifically, I am concerned with a critical
18 By ‘metaphysical impositions,’ I mean to describe the problems associated with theories o f critical 
modernity that are grounded in a subjective paradigm, and are therefore ultimately dependent upon 
essentialist understandings o f humanity and human activity. These approaches take up a metaphysical 
approach that, being subjectively oriented, likewise essentialize human exchange, and depend on a 
normative foundation that is removed from the activity of human existence. As such, they impose a 
metaphysical understanding upon human activity rather than use the practice o f intersubjective human 
exchange as their normative foundation.
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modernist context, particularly since the two central theorists to be used in this argument
are themselves clearly situated in this context. In Chapter 1 ,1 have already listed some of
the characteristics of modernity, and the transition from pre-modem to modem. Such
questions have, since the emergence of modernity, been the focus of critical theory.
Following the leads of Marx, Nietzsche and Max Weber, Critical Theory has been 
deeply concerned with the fate of modernity, and has offered systematic and 
comprehensive theories of the trajectory of modernity, combined with critical 
diagnoses of some of the latter’s limitations, pathologies and destructive effects— 
while providing defenses of some of its progressive elements. (Kellner, 1989:3)
One of the continuing central foci of critical theory has been concerned with questions of
rationality and normativity. With the emergence of modernity, there is the proposed end
of metaphysics, and at least the recognition that philosophical questions can no longer
simply depend upon something beyond and outside of humanity (Nietzsche’s famous
dictum, “God is dead” is emblematic of this modem dilemma). But how is it possible to
ground normative theory and theories of rationality in humanity without either
objectifying human society, or falling into relativism? Such a question has challenged
the projects of critical modernity since their inception. It is possible to delineate two
approaches to this dilemma of modernity:
The project of modernity...has been accompanied since its inception in the 
Enlightenment by a counter-reckoning consisting of two independent strands: the 
critique of the capitalist model of modernization (here the name of Karl Marx has 
come to be representative) and the critique of reason as the will to instrumental 
power (here the name of Friedrich Nietzsche springs to mind)... Refusing to 
abandon the first strand of the critique of Enlightenment or to give in to the 
second, Jurgen Habermas has explored another alternative: the possibility of a 
nonrepressive conception of reason—that is, a conception that provides standards 
for the critique of irrational or unjust forms of individual and social life while 
avoiding possibly repressive metaphysical projections. (Cooke, 1994:ix)
That is, Habermas is interested in proposing a theory of modernity that is critical of the
process of modernization and rationalization that has occurred through the model of
27
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capitalism (following Marx), but which does not jettison the concept of rationality in its
entirety, seeking instead to uncover another ‘nonrepressive conception of reason’ upon
which he can ground his normative critique. Habermas’s solution for this normative
dilemma, then, is his post-metaphysical yet non defeatist conception of reason, namely
communicative rationality, which, he contends “is already operative in the everyday
linguistic practices of modem societies...[and] falls prey neither to the repressive
objectivism against which critics of the Enlightenment have warned nor to the perils of a
relativism that would undermine the very basis of a critical theory of society” (Cooke,
1994:xi). This conception of rationality is also distinctly intersubjective, and stands
against subjectively-oriented critical theories of modernity. It will therefore be useful to
include a brief discussion of the subjective paradigm of previous theories of modernity
before turning to a discussion of Habermas’s treatment of the dilemma of critical
modernity which leads to the solution of communicative rationality which he proposes
through his program of formal pragmatics.
The subject-oriented paradigm of various models of modernity is among the
specific problems that Habermas’s work must address in order to resolve this normative
dilemma of critical modernity. The subjective paradigm takes as its starting point human
consciousness and existence as a subject existing in and knowing the world. Humans are
conceived of as separate and distinct individuals, apart from the world and each other,
and characterized by their own discrete consciousnesses.
This monological approach pre-ordained certain ways of posing the basic 
problems of thought and action: subject versus object, reason versus sense, reason 
versus desire, mind versus body, self versus other, and so on... In the atomistic 
perspective of much of modem thought, the subject stands over against a world of 
objects... Accordingly, the type of rationality associated with this model is the 
“cognitive-instrumental” rationality of a subject capable of gaining knowledge
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about a contingent environment and putting it to effective use in intelligently 
adapting to and manipulating that environment. (McCarthy in Habermas, 1984:ix, 
xi)
The result of this subject-oriented paradigm was the return to a metaphysical dilemma, 
one in which the thinking and acting subject objectifies the world around herself and by 
doing so, acts in abstraction from other humans and from the world. The metaphysical 
grounding was no longer some external and abstract force necessarily (like God or fate), 
but rather my own reason as a thinking and acting subject, which was not removed from 
myself, but from all others who are positioned outside of myself as objects. Such a 
paradigm poses activity and thought as action or thought upon an object; that is, as a 
subject I do not act with another subject, but rather upon him or her, as simply one more 
object in the world around myself in which I am the subject. This paradigm is therefore 
characterized by a specific notion of rationality (as described in the quotation above), 
namely instrumental rationality, in which my reasons are guided by my ability to use the 
objects in the world around me to achieve my own ends. The justification of my own 
thought and action resides in my own consciousness, and is justified by how it serves my 
own specific goals.19 Such a paradigm therefore significantly undermines the possibility 
of action or thought with other subjects, since while it is possible to recognize the 
existence of other subjects in the world, through this paradigm it is impossible for me to 
interact with them without objectifying (and even instrumentalizing) them. This is, then, 
the modern paradigm of the subject, and one of the central dilemmas that Habermas’s 
work is ultimately concerned with addressing. Let me move on, now, to a discussion of 
Habermas’s work as an attempt to address these various dilemmas with critical theories 
of modernity.
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Early Habermas: From Knowledge to Communication
Habermas is widely considered “the foremost contemporary representative of the 
critical theory associated with the Frankfurt School” (Macey, 2000:173). Following the 
work of his predecessors in the Frankfurt School, Habermas was concerned with 
generating a critical theory of society that addressed the social pathologies and oppressive 
tendencies observable in modem society. And, like his fellow Frankfurters, Habermas 
has been concerned with developing a holistic critical theory that draws from a host of 
philosophical traditions and has important implications for a great variety of academic 
disciplines, but that is also guided by an emancipatory potential in such critical 
theorizing.
The first systematic attempt by Habermas to qualify, work out, and present a 
framework for critical theory is based upon a theory of knowledge and its relation to 
human interests (aptly titled, in English, Knowledge and Human Interests) in 1971. In 
this work, Habermas argues that there are three different processes of scientific inquiry: 
empirical-analytic, historical-hermeneutic, and critically oriented. He is mostly 
concerned with the latter form of inquiry, largely because he links it to an emancipatory 
cognitive interest, and because he feels that it is only through critically oriented inquiry 
that the project of modernity can reveal its truly emancipatory potential. In other words, 
Habermas sees in critically-oriented human inquiry an emancipatory interest, an attempt 
to take hold of the potential of modernity and employ it in a project of emancipation. 
What Habermas is particularly interested in developing with his discussion in Knowledge 
and Human Interests is a framework for a critical theory that is a
19 This is where Nietzsche’s ‘critique of reason as the will to instrumental power’ emerges.
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critical social theory [that] is empirical without being reducible to empirical- 
analytic science; it is philosophical but in the sense of critique and not of first 
philosophy; it is historical without being historicist; and it is practical, not in the 
sense of possessing a technological potential but in the sense of being oriented to 
enlightenment and emancipation... In other words, what was called for was a 
marriage of the scientific and empirical with the practical and critical... to 
reconstruct the self-formative process of the species in an attempt to achieve a 
self-understanding freed from ideological delusion. (McCarthy, 1978:126-127)
Habermas’s purpose is to provide a framework for critical theory that is distinctly
praxical, focused upon critical reflection and material action, without being objectifying
or reductionist. He is, however, largely unable to produce such a complete foundation for
critical theory in this early work, still largely confining his argument to a subject-oriented
paradigm. Habermas’s later work, especially his articulation of the program of formal
pragmatics, offers a much more promising foundation for critical theory, and based on his
methodology of ‘reconstructive science,’ begins to move us towards a paradigm of
intersubjectivity that is necessary for the development of his theory of communicative
action. Before turning to such a discussion, however, I will briefly interject a discussion
on pragmatics generally which will be useful in understanding Habermas’s approach.
Pragmatics
Since formal pragmatics is couched initially in terms of the philosophy of 
language, it will be useful to begin this examination by briefly situating pragmatics. We 
can think broadly of the philosophy of language as the study of language. Within this 
broad study, two main approaches to the study of language can be identified, namely 
semantics and pragmatics. We can differentiate these two approaches by distinguishing 
their positions on the relationship between language and meaning. Semantics is largely 
concerned with how the various different elements of language are related to meaning;
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that is, how does a sentence convey meaning, how do the words of a sentence convey 
meaning, and how does the relationship between the words of a sentence affect the 
meaning of the sentence, and convey meaning. Semantics is largely concerned with the 
specific and internal relationship between meaning and language.20 Pragmatics, by 
contrast, is concerned with how language in use is related to meaning. In other words, 
pragmatics is concerned with how our use of language affects the conveyed meaning of 
language.21 Implicit in the approach taken by pragmatics is a concern with the 
performance undertaken in language use, that is, what are we doing with the use of 
language. As a result of this concern with the activity performed in language, pragmatics
tends to focus upon more discrete expressions of language, usually understood or
22described as utterances as opposed to sentences or phrases.
Initially, one of the strengths of the pragmatic approach to language over the 
semantic, particularly for Habermas, is that, because of its orientation towards language- 
in-use, a pragmatic orientation to language and meaning is necessarily bound up in the 
relationship and exchange between language users. Whereas semantic approaches are 
generally more concerned with the intended meaning of language, or the conditions under 
which language is true (that is, how language accurately reflects the objective world, a 
state or affairs, a feeling, etc.), as well as the relationship between the grammatical
20 “Linguistic semantics is the detailed study (typically within the truth-conditional format) o f particular 
types o f construction in particular natural languages, e.g., belief-clauses in English or adverbial phrases in 
Kwakiutl” (Audi, 1999:674).
21 “Pragmatics studies the use o f language in context, and the context-dependence o f  various aspects of 
linguistic interpretation” (Audi, 1999:675).
22 This is specifically a characteristic of speech-act theory, a branch o f pragmatics that “presumes the 
prepositional or ‘locutionary’ meanings o f utterances and studies... the illocutionary forces o f those 
utterances, the distinctive types o f linguistic act that are performed by the speaker in making them” (Audi, 
1999:675). We can understand utterances also as being defined by a change o f  speaking turn, which may 
have no relation at all to the completion o f a grammatically well-formed sentence (which is the object of 
semantic investigation).
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elements of a sentence, a pragmatic approach is concerned with the relationship between 
speakers, and the actual linguistic exchange and how language is used to reach an 
agreement about meaning. That is to say, while a semantic approach can largely 
approach the study of language in abstraction from the interactional, actual, and 
performative use of language, pragmatics specifically focuses upon the concrete 
exchange in language of its participants to convey meaning. Pragmatics explicitly seeks 
the relationship between meaning and language in the actual and performative use of 
language. By initially adopting this pragmatic approach of language-in-use, and focusing 
on the actual performance of language, pragmatics allows us to study (not only language 
use, but also) the intentionality and truth conditions of linguistically mediated 
communication. Such an approach is not concerned specifically with the meanings of 
discrete words or sentences, but rather with the meanings of utterances as they are used in 
a specific context of exchange to convey meaning.
An example may be useful in clarifying the difference between the semantic and 
pragmatic approaches to language and communication. Let me propose the following 
situation: While outside smoking, someone approaches me and asks, ‘May I have a 
cigarette?’ to which I respond, ‘Smoking causes cancer.’ A general semantic approach to 
such an exchange would be concerned with how the linguistic construction of such an 
exchange conveys meaning, and the possible meanings that could be reflected in such an 
exchange. A semantic approach would seek to demonstrate the link between ‘cigarettes’ 
and ‘smoking,’ to determine whether or not such a linguistic linkage conveys meaning. 
A general pragmatic approach to the same exchange, however, would focus on the 
activity being performed in the exchange, and the relationship and context of the
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exchange. Since my proposed response in the exchange is neither an explicit ‘yes’ or 
‘no,’ a pragmatic approach would seek to understand such a response from the context of 
the exchange, and draw conclusions about the performance I would be undertaking in 
making such a response. Drawing such conclusions through a pragmatic approach would 
also present conclusions concerning possible intents and meanings being conveyed in the 
exchange as well.
Alongside this first advantage of a pragmatic approach, namely that it focuses on 
the actual exchange, the context of the exchange, and therefore the relationship between 
the participants, is a second quality of pragmatics, that it is also implicitly action- 
oriented. As described above, pragmatics is concerned with the performance of 
language, the activity of language-in-use. Particularly in the work of such pragmatists as 
Austin and Searle, the object of linguistic study is the speech act of an utterance. From 
such a pragmatic perspective, when using language, one is participating in an action; one 
expresses, questions, commands, asserts, promises, etc. when one participates in language 
use. The assertion of pragmatics is that in any utterance there is an implicit (or explicit) 
action undertaken. In the above example, the response ‘smoking causes cancer’ could be 
an assertion or a promise, each of which are implicit actions in that utterance.
While Habermas’s project is explicitly pragmatically oriented, it is an adopted and 
distinct model of pragmatics that is specifically his own, and largely concerned with his 
reconstructive methodology, also a part of his larger critical social theory. Let me turn 
now to a description of his own particular program of formal pragmatics.
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Habermas’s Program of Formal Pragmatics
As previously stated, Habermas’s program of formal pragmatics forms the 
starting point of his philosophy, the entry point that logically extends through his theory 
of communicative action to his critical theory of society. It is in this theoretical program 
that Habermas develops his pragmatic theory of communication, and how he 
demonstrates the centrality of communication in both rationality and action in the 
constitution of a critical theory. Through his formal pragmatics, Habermas proposes a 
new intersubjective paradigm, and provides a normative foundation for critical theory 
that can avoid the pitfalls and difficulties previously associated with critical modernity.
At this point, it will be useful to briefly digress into a discussion concerning 
Habermas’s paradigm of intersubjectivity. Posed as a response to the subjectively- 
grounded paradigm of other theories of modernity, Habermas is interested in proposing 
an intersubjective paradigm, demonstrated through the process of communication, which 
allows for a theoretical realization of the emergence of communicative rationality in 
modernity. As discussed before, one of the central problems of the subjective paradigm 
is the reduction of rationality to instrumental rationality, and its inability to deal with 
subjects interacting with each other, as opposed to upon each other. The proposition of 
an intersubjective paradigm is central to Habermas’s entire critical project and his 
concern with revealing communicative rationality as the central moment of modem 
rationality, as the foundation upon which he basis his normative intent. Specifically, 
Habermas is concerned with proposing that, as opposed to a subject-oriented paradigm, 
subjects can interact without objectifying each other, and that this intersubjectivity is 
directly shown through the process of communication.
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Until now the topic has been the epistemic self-relation, the relation of the 
problem-solving, i.e., knowing subject to itself. The turn to an intersubjectivistic 
way of looking at things leads in the matter of “subjectivity” to a surprising result: 
the consciousness that is centered, as it seems, in the ego is not something 
immediate or purely inward. Rather, self-consciousness forms itself on the path 
from without to within, through the symbolically mediated relationship to a 
partner in interaction. To this extent it possesses an intersubjective core; its 
eccentric position attests to the tenacious dependence of subjectivity upon 
language as the medium through which one recognizes oneself in the other in a 
nonobjectifying manner. (Habermas, 1992:177-178)
In other words, Habermas is interested in demonstrating that through language, two
subjects interact in such a way that does not necessarily objectify the other, but rather act
together as subjects, constituting their own subjectivity through the interaction of
communication. This is, then, in a word, Habermas’s intersubjective paradigm, and
centrally demonstrates the importance of communication and the possibility of
communicative rationality. These notions of intersubjectivity and communicative
rationality (and action) are developed, as mentioned above, in Habermas’s theory of
formal pragmatics, to which I will now return.
Communication (and particularly in a pragmatic sense of everyday, actual and
used communication) then, is the focus of Habermas’s theorization of a normative
framework upon which to justify a critical theory of society.
Habermas’s formal-pragmatic investigations into everyday linguistic practices in 
modem societies are attempts to reconstruct the universal competencies that are 
involved when social actors interact with the aim of achieving mutual 
understanding. (Cooke, 1998:2)
Or, in Habermas’s own words, “the task of universal pragmatics is to identify and 
reconstmct universal conditions of possible mutual understanding” (Habermas 1998:21).
Let me briefly describe what Habermas is proposing with his program of formal 
pragmatics. By ‘formal,’ he is concerned with the “rational reconstruction of concepts,
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criteria, rules, and schemata” (Habermas 1998:29) which affect the ‘pragmatic’ aspects of 
language, “those pertaining specifically to the employment of sentences in utterances” 
(Cooke, 1998:2). In other words, Habermas’s program of formal pragmatics is concerned 
with analyzing the universal concepts, criteria, rules and schemata that affect how 
language is actually used to achieve understanding between participants engaged in 
language use. By undertaking such a ‘rational reconstruction,’ Habermas is concerned 
with how the actual use of language reveals certain relationships and activities in the use 
of language.
Before turning immediately to formal pragmatics, it will be useful to explain
Habermas’s notion of ‘reconstructive science.’ Developed out of his earlier work in an
attempt to reformulate the foundations of a critical theory of society, Habermas finally
settles upon the methodology of reconstruction in his formulations of critical theory.
Initially, this methodological approach is concerned with
an attempt to integrate basic categories and assumptions of action theory 
(meaning and intentionality, roles and norms, rules and standards, and so forth) 
with elements of functionalist systems theory (structure and function, system and 
process, differentiation and adaptation, and so forth). (McCarthy, 1978:233)
Such a methodology reflects the complexity of Habermas’s project and demonstrates the
variety of sources he incorporates into his approach to critical theory. So then, what is
‘reconstructive science’? “Habermas uses this term to designate any undertaking aimed
at the explicit, systematic reconstruction of implicit, ‘pretheoretical’ knowledge”
(McCarthy, 1978:276). In other words, such a methodology is concerned with carefully
and systematically uncovering the ‘taken-for-granted’ rules and schemata which we draw
from in undertaking thought, speech, or action.
37
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The underlying idea is that acting and speaking subjects know how to achieve, 
accomplish, perform, and produce a variety of things without explicitly adverting 
to, or being able to give an explicit account of the concepts, rules, criteria, and 
schemata on which their performance is based. (McCarthy, 1978:276)
Reconstructive science seeks to uncover these rules, concepts, schemata and criteria, the
structure and elements of speech and action, that regularly (and indeed, universally) bind
the limits and use of our speech and actions. Three often-cited examples of
reconstructive sciences in Habermas’s view are Chomsky’s theory of generative
grammar, Piaget’s theory of cognitive development, and Kohlberg’s theory of moral
development.
Another way of understanding Habermas’s methodology of reconstruction is by
looking at his notion of communicative competence, which will also begin to lead us
directly into a discussion of formal pragmatics. Theories of competence generally reflect
Habermas’s methodology of reconstruction since they are concerned with the rules that
participants must understand in order to participate in any given activity, universally.
Thus, for example, the linguist’s concern with generative grammar, the logician’s 
concern with relations of exclusion, implication, and consistency among 
propositions, the developmental psychologist’s concern with cognitive schemata 
are not directed merely to special competences of particular groups or individuals 
but to universal competences of the species (McCarthy, 1978:277)
That is, the linguist seeking the rules of generative grammar which make up the
necessary universal competence for the use of language is making use of the
methodology of reconstructive science. However, Habermas’s reconstructive approach is
not merely linguistic or semantic, but rather pragmatic, focusing on communicative
competence as opposed to simply linguistic competence, that is the competence
participants must have in the use of language beyond simply being competent in forming
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'J'Xgrammatically correct sentences. Habermas proposes that, by adopting a pragmatic 
approach to language(-in-use), we can delineate (aside from the competence of using 
language grammatically correctly) three necessary (and universal) competences:
i. to choose the prepositional sentence in such a way that either the truth 
conditions of the proposition stated or the existential presuppositions of the 
prepositional content mentioned are supposedly fulfilled (so that the hearer can 
share the knowledge of the speaker);
ii. To express his intentions in such a way that the linguistic expression represents 
what is intended (so that the hearer can trust the speaker); and
iii. To perform the speech act in such a way that it conforms to recognized norms 
or to accepted self-images (so that the hearer can be in accord with the speaker in 
shared value orientations). (Habermas, 1998:50)
In other words, Habermas’s notion of communicative competence is concerned with
demonstrating the universal and tacit knowledge participants in communication must
have in order to communicate. Accordingly, competent participants in communication
must be able to form grammatically correct utterances that can be understood
linguistically, that can represent something objectively in the world, that can be expressed
sincerely, and that conform to the interactional and social context of the utterance. Each
of these competencies, in turn, demonstrates a relationship with different orders of
reality:
The competence to use language representatively is a precondition of the ability to 
make a...distinction between a public world...and a private world... The 
competence to use language expressively is a precondition of the ability to make a 
second distinction...between the individual self...and the various utterances, 
expressions and actions in which it appears... The competence to use language 
interactively is a precondition of the ability to mark a third distinction... between 
what is.. .and what ought to be. (McCarthy, 1978:281-2)
Habermas’s theory of communicative competence, then, is concerned with “the ability to
‘embed’ language in a network of relations to the different orders of reality” and “would
23 “The production o f sentences according to the rules o f grammar is something other than the use of 
sentences in accordance with pragmatic rules that shape the infrastructure o f speech situations” (Habermas,
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thus provide a unifying framework for a variety of theoretical endeavours... from theories 
of knowledge and action to the theories of socialization and ideology” (McCarthy, 
1978:282).
This theory of competences brings us directly into a discussion of Habermas’s 
notion of the validity basis of speech. Habermas proposes that “in or after the 
performance of this act [of speech], we can become aware that we have involuntarily 
made certain assumptions” (Habermas 1998:22). These assumptions are what Habermas 
characterizes as the validity claims made in the performance of an utterance, and there 
are four of them: the claim of intelligibility, the claim of truth, the claim of sincerity, and 
the claim of rightness. I have already briefly described these validity claims in the first 
chapter and indirectly through the notion of communicative competence, but it will be 
useful to specifically recall these validity claims again. Each validity claim is at least 
implicit in any utterance, and can be specifically thematized in argumentative 
communication. Each claim is also made in the context of a specific relationship. The 
claim of intelligibility is made in relation to the grammatically correct use of language, or 
that what is actually said may actually be understood. The claim of truth is made in 
relation to the objective world that can be observed and described, or that what is actually 
said can actually be seen to be true. The claim of sincerity is made in relation to the 
speakers own subjective consciousness, and is concerned with whether the speaker is 
expressing an utterance sincerely or if she is being false (that is, she does not actually 
believe what she is saying). The claim of rightness, finally, is made in relation to the 
social interaction undertaken between the participants in the expression of an utterance. 
That is, claims of rightness are concerned with the context of the social norms in which
1998:48).
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language use takes place. Adopting this perspective of validity claims, we can see that in 
any utterance, competent speakers are raising these four validity claims, and that in order 
to be communicatively competent, it is necessary to, at least implicitly, recognize the use 
of these claims in any utterance.
It will be useful at this point to return again also to the discussion of illocutionary 
forces brought up in the first chapter in order to demonstrate both the validity basis of 
speech and that the “orientation to reaching understanding is the original mode of 
language use” (Habermas, 1984:288). Following Austin’s speech act theory, any 
utterance accomplishes three acts, the locutionary, the illocutionary, and the 
perlocutionary. To review, the locutionary act is the actual expression of an utterance, 
the illocutionary act is the act undertaken in expressing an utterance (promising, 
threatening, stating, etc.), and the perlocutionary act is objective activity caused through 
the expression of an utterance. The illocutionary aim of an utterance, then, is explicitly 
expressed in that utterance, and cannot be understood or evaluated outside of that express 
utterance. A speaker’s illocutionary aim, then, can only be achieved through a 
communicative exchange, and its success or failure can only be measured by either a 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ response. The perlocutionary aims of a speaker are outside of the expressed 
utterance, and therefore cannot be evaluated within it. Therefore, this centrality of the 
illocutionary force to an utterance demonstrates the original mode of language use being 
oriented towards understanding; a hearer can only respond to an illocutionary act by 
understanding it in an utterance, and by agreeing or disagreeing with it.
In this sense then, the illocutionary act of an utterance is analogous to the validity 
claims raised in an utterance. Habermas’s distinction is important however, because it
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delineates four different validity claims, and seeks to establish more specifically the 
conditions under which an utterance can be accepted or rejected, that is, under what 
conditions a competent hearer can respond to any utterance with a ‘yes’ or a ‘no.’
While the notion of validity claims (also expressed in the notion of illocutionary 
acts) forms part of the universal rules and criteria of the conditions which effect the 
possibility of mutual understanding, it will be necessary to look more deeply at how 
validity claims are actually raised and redeemed in communication in order to fill out 
Habermas’s program of formal pragmatics. Since each validity claim is made in relation 
to a specific realm or sphere (of a subjective world, or an objective world, or an 
intersubjective world), each claim thematizes a certain relationship. All validity claims 
are implicitly raised in any utterance, but certain utterances, such as those that would 
cause disagreement, misunderstanding, confusion, or argument tend to specifically 
thematize a specific validity claim. If, for example, I say ‘I am two feet tall,’ while I am 
raising all four validity claims, the one most likely to be thematized in argumentation 
would be the claim of truth, the claim to the objective world. If I were to say to a student 
‘rob a bank and bring me the money,’ the claim of rightness would most obviously be 
called into question. By making such a statement, if I am communicatively competent, I 
am raising validity claims that, if I am oriented towards reaching an understanding, I 
must be able to justify. Let me propose another example. Again, I am outside smoking, 
and someone approaches me, and says, ‘I order you to stop smoking.’ In such an 
utterance, the person I am approached by is raising all validity claims. I am, most likely, 
however, to thematize their claim of rightness, and seek justification of this claim if I am 
to reach an agreement with that person. I would, by thematizing their claim of rightness,
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be concerned with their justification of the normative authority with which they are able 
to make such an order. I could be challenging their personal office, position, or title 
which would give them the authority to make such a claim. I could be challenging the 
social norms of where and when smoking is acceptable. However, in any case, if I am to 
challenge the validity of their utterance, I can be expected only to accept or reject it on 
specific reasons. Either their reasons are good enough and convince me that, after 
challenging the validity of their order, I should accept and stop smoking, or their reasons 
are inadequate and 1 reject their order. Any communication, then, undertaken with an 
orientation towards reaching an understanding, is bound to the illocutionary force of the 
utterance, and must be either accepted or rejected according to the redemption or 
rejection of the validity claims in contention in the utterance.
This is as such, Habermas’s program of formal pragmatics. Concerned with 
“what it means to understand an utterance” (Habermas, 1984:297), formal pragmatics 
focuses on the reconstruction of the universal conditions and communicative 
competences that effect the possibility of reaching mutual understanding through speech. 
By developing an argument concerning the validity basis of speech, and by 
demonstrating through the notion of illocutionary acts the original orientation to 
understanding of language use, Habermas is able to contend that the process of 
communication, undertaken by competent communicators, is necessarily and universally 
oriented to understanding, and that any utterance can be redeemed and agreed upon 
through raising and redeeming (or rejecting) the validity claims of an utterance. From 
this program of formal pragmatics, Habermas is able to articulate a new normative 
foundation from which to develop a critical social theory. Let us turn now, then, to how
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this program of formal pragmatics is connected to Habermas’s theory of communicative 
action.
Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action (and Rationality)
Building from his program of formal pragmatics as a solution to the dilemmas of 
critical modernity and as a foundation upon which to ground critical theory, Habermas’s 
theory of communicative action forms the centrepiece of his critical sociological theory. 
Habermas’s theory of communicative action, as described in the previous chapter briefly, 
is an attempt to distinguish between different forms of rationally coordinated social 
action through the forms of communication that characterize, organize, and direct such 
action. He is specifically concerned with developing a “theory of communication... 
[that] could be made fruitful for a sociological theory of action... [to] show how 
communicative acts...take on the function of coordinating action and make their 
contribution to building up interactions” (Habermas, 1984:278). Specifically, he is taking 
up the work of his program of formal pragmatics to develop out of its specific theory of 
communication a sociological theory of praxis that draws from the characteristics of 
communication described above.
Along with his specific theory of communication, as described above, Habermas 
is also interested in developing his notion of communicative rationality, which also forms 
an important and fundamental aspect of his theory of communicative action. This notion 
of communicative rationality, while already at least implicit in his early work, is central 
to his critical theory, and is again an attempt to provide a solution to some of the 
problems of earlier theories of critical modernity. “The term ‘communicative rationality’
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refers to the rational potential of action oriented toward understanding, the structural
characteristics of which Habermas identifies by means of his formal pragmatic
investigations into everyday language” (Cooke, 1994:29). That is, communicative
rationality is revealed as the initial moment of modem rationality that governs the process
of inter subjective communication, and, as opposed to instrumental rationality, serves to
coordinate action through the communicatively-achieved agreement reached by the
participants in such action. Communicative rationality is revealed in the process of valid
communication (communication in which the claims made are redeemed or rejected
according to their validity), and serves as the guiding rationality of such communication,
as well as the action coordinated by such communication. Contrasted with his notions of
instmmental and strategic rationality, Habermas is concerned with demonstrating that
communicative rationality is the initial instance of modem rationality, and that all other
forms of rationality are derivative and parasitic to this fundamental form of rationality.
Importantly, Habermas is concerned with proposing an inter subjective model of
rationality that releases critical theory from its initial subject-object orientation towards
rationality, and as such, provides a viable ‘postmetaphysicaT model of rationality.
The route to such a concept [of inter subjective rationality] proceeds via the 
modem philosophy of the subject. Since Descartes, the emphatic sense of 
individuality has been associated with the spontaneous ego, of the I. The 
affiliated subject-object model of consciousness, however, proved inadequate for 
developing this insight. In German Idealism, this paradigm took shape as the 
mirror-model of self-consciousness: consciousness gets hold of itself by being 
reflected back on itself out of the world of objects of which it is conscious. 
However, what is “gotten hold o f ’ proves not to be the spontaneous ego as the 
subject of consciousness.. .since that would require that the subject be an object of 
consciousness. The spontaneous subject recedes from consciousness of itself. At 
best, then, consciousness can come to know the empirical ego; but this appears as 
merely one more object. So there remains no place for the individual between 
consciousness in the first-person, as the receding subject, and consciousness in the 
third-person, as a causally determined object. (Hohengarten, 1992:xiii-xiv).
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This is one of the central problems of earlier models of critical theory for Habermas. 
Solipsistic models of rationality and consciousness confined the theoretical endeavours of 
critical modernity to notions of instrumental and purposive rationality, and any 
sociological theories of action derived from such notions of rationality are inherently 
unable to recognize or deal with the communicative and intersubjective dimensions of 
action, and are notably restricted by their metaphysical foundations. The solution to this 
philosophical impasse, that is, the problem of a metaphysical and subject-oriented model 
of modernity, is, for Habermas, the recognition of communicative rationality in a 
paradigm of intersubjectivity, and the development of such a notion of rationality to 
demonstrate that communicative rationality is the initial form of rationality, that other 
forms of rationality (namely instrumental and strategic rationality) are only parasitic of 
communicative rationality, which is particularly demonstrated in Habermas’s treatment 
of a theory of illocutionary forces as discussed above.
Habermas’s notion of communicative rationality, and his assertion of its primacy 
among other forms of rationality, is mostly demonstrated through his theory of 
communication as described by his formal pragmatics. Since the use of language to 
reach understanding is the original mode of language use, and since participants in 
communication must possess communicative competence, implicitly or explicitly raising 
and redeeming (or rejecting) validity claims in any utterance, such activity must be 
governed by a form of rationality that is specifically intersubjectively oriented, and not 
instrumentally, since the process of communication is ultimately concerned with reaching 
mutual understanding. Such a process cannot be governed by an instrumental rationality, 
since mutual understanding is not the purpose or goal of instrumentally governed
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interaction. Using this basis of the intersubjectivity and purpose of mutual understanding 
and coordination that he finds inherent in communication, Habermas argues for the 
notion of communicative rationality as the central form of rationality from which other 
are derived.
Let me turn now to a discussion of Habermas’s theory of communicative action, 
of which communicative rationality is an important aspect. Built upon his program of 
formal pragmatics, and informed by a notion of communicative rationality, this theory of 
communicative action is concerned with developing a critical theory of sociological 
action which demonstrates the centrality of communication as a coordinating media for 
social activity and organization. Communicative action is, essentially, “a form of social 
integration in which the plans of action of various agents are coordinated through an 
exchange of communicative acts—that is, through the use of language... oriented toward 
understanding” (Cooke, 1994:9). That is, communicative action is (particularly social) 
action which is achieved and coordinated through the process of communication, by 
competent participants in communication organizing their activity through the process of 
pursuing mutual understanding.
We can also understand communicative action by what it is opposed to, or 
contradictory to. Communicative action cannot occur under conditions of coercion or 
any force (or threat of force) other than the force of the better argument. Such coercion 
‘short-cuts’ the process of communication, and prevents the possibility of reaching 
mutual understanding through competent communication, i.e., through the process of 
raising and redeeming (or rejecting) the validity of any speech act in the process of 
argumentative communication. If force (or the threat of force) is imposed upon the
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communication process, such communication is no longer strictly bound by 
communicative rationality and does not meet the requirements of the validity basis of 
communication, and therefore any action or coordinated activity resulting from such a 
process of coercive communication could not be described as communicative action. 
Since the communication process which coordinated the action was not ‘communicative’ 
in the real sense for Habermas, the subsequent action would also not be communicative.
The importance of this theory of communicative action rests in its ability to 
explain, understand and qualify social and coordinated action in terms of the 
communicative processes at its base, through the intersubjective communicative (or 
strategic or instrumental) rationality employed in achieving understanding in order to 
cause and achieve some specific action. With his theory of communicative action, 
Habermas presents a critical sociological theory which builds upon his program of formal 
pragmatics and its associated methodology of reconstruction and theory of 
communication in order to demonstrate the centrality of communication to the process of 
social and coordinated action which can be evaluated through this theory to determine its 
communicative potential and validity. Such communicative action proposes the 
possibility of socially co-ordinated action which, by being guided by communicative 
rationality, reflects a moment of democratic potential in social organization. In order to 
clearly reveal this moment, however, it will be useful to turn to a discussion of another 
theoretical dimension to Habermas’s work, his theory of ethical discourse.
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Ethical Discourse
Finally, I can now turn to Flabermas’s theory of ethical discourse, a theory 
growing out of his theories of communicative action and rationality, and demonstrating 
the specific universal claims that can be made with respect to the process of discourse so 
that an argument can be proposed concerning the ethical quality of discourse, and the 
possibility for democratic communication and social coordination and action. 
Habermas’s theory of ethical discourse centres on the various elements developed in the 
rest of his theoretical project, but is specifically concerned with the validity basis of 
discourse, and the redemption (or rejection) of validity claims in the process of reaching 
an understanding through communication. Ethical discourse presents a theory located 
more specifically in the field of moral philosophy, but couched in his communicative 
theory, and his assertion of intersubjectivity, in which Habermas develops an argument 
concerning the very specific and micro-social interactions of discourse, contending that 
discourse can be ethically evaluated.24 With this theory of ethical discourse, Habermas 
argues that a universalized principle of argumentation (and norm establishment) can be 
conceived which allows participants to reach agreement in moral argumentation. Using 
much of his formulation of speech acts from his theory of communicative action 
(especially his treatment of validity claims), Habermas contends that his model of 
discourse ethics provides a new moral imperative (particularly as contrasted to Kant’s 
categorical imperative), whose “principle postulates, Only those norms may claim to be 
valid that could meet with the consent of all affected in role as participants in a practical 
discourse” (Habermas, 1990:197). Such a moral philosophy, while not only specifically
24 Habermas develops this notion o f ethical discourse largely in two works, Moral Consciousness and 
Communicative Action (1990) and Justification and Application (1993).
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addressing the very basic interactional exchanges between participants, has deep
implications for the procedures of modem societies, and the constitution of their
institutions. It also specifically seeks to establish a normative grounding and moral
theory out of the project of critical modernity, but one that is not metaphysically
grounded, but rather founded upon the intersubjective process of communication, and
guided by communicative rationality.
According to Habermas, both theoretical (scientific) and practical [moral] 
discourses are argumentative enterprises in which tmth and rightness claims, 
respectively, are systematically tested and contested through the invocation of 
validating reasons. Yet, the two discourses are not entirely congruent or 
symmetrical due to the cultural (nonnatural) status of ethics... Regarding 
validating reasons in practical argumentation, Habermas concurs with...[the idea 
of] the inapplicability (or only partial applicability) of inductive and deductive 
procedures. Hence, to permit the assessment of concrete norms, (meta) ethics 
requires a kind of “bridge principle” which performs an equivalent role to 
induction in empirical science and deduction in logic...such a bridging or linking 
rule can be found in the “principle of universalization” ... In Habermas’s view, 
however, universalization should not be restricted to an abstract formalism and 
certainly not to a rule governing only in foro inter no; rather, in conformity with 
the turn to pragmatics, the principle has a social or public function by prescribing 
impartiality and general reciprocity. (Benhabib and Dallmayr, 1990:7-8)
That is, Habermas’s program of discourse ethics is concerned with providing a universal
principle (“only those norms may claim to be valid that could meet with the consent of all
affected in role as participants in a practical discourse”) which provides the possibility for
ethically evaluating discourse, through the pragmatic theory of communication already
developed in the rest of his theoretical project. Such a theory of discourse ethics, because
of its pragmatic orientation, connects the process of discourse to the constitution of
norms, and the social activity coordinated through the process of communication. In
such a model, discourse is not simply ‘idle talk,’ but rather directly connected to the
process of socially coordinated activity, and therefore, if discourse can be ethically
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evaluated, such an evaluation would have implications for the activity coordinated 
through such discourse. If the resulting activity has been coordinated through ethical 
discourse, it can be characterized as ‘right.’ If, however, such activity is coordinated 
through unethical (strategic or instrumental) discourse, it could not be characterized as 
such, and would be open to ethical criticism. Such a universal principle of ethical 
discourse, then, provides an important possibility of evaluating social activity 
(universally) to determine its ethical quality.
Finally, this universal principle of ethical discourse is importantly connected to 
democracy in Habermas’s work. Taking this approach to discourse allows one to 
evaluate the social activity or norms generated as a result of discourse, as described 
above. We can take, following Habermas’s pragmatic approach, any social activity, 
norm, or institutionalization, to be the result of action coordinated through 
communication. Since we can evaluate the process of communication undertaken to 
result in these activities, norms, or institutions, we can infer evaluations of those 
activities, norms, or institutions. The justification of such is demonstrated by its 
adherence (or rejection) of the universal principle of ethical discourse. This principle is 
clearly inclusive and democratic. All participants affected must be part of the discourse 
which generates any norm, and all challenges to claims of the validity of the norm must 
be dealt with under the same principle. Norms generated according to this principle, 
then, besides being ethically justifiable, can be qualified as specifically democratic. 
Therefore, we can qualify the social activities, norms, and institutions generated through 
discourse as either democratic or not, according to their observance of this universal 
principle of ethical discourse. By proposing such a theory of discourse ethics, Habermas
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is not simply concerned with generating a moral theory of argumentation and 
communication, but rather with proposing a theory which provides a normative 
framework in which to evaluate social activity, and a foundation from which to 
demonstrate the democratic quality of the existing process and institution of society.
This is, then, an overview of Habermas’s critical theory of society, based upon his 
pragmatically-informed theory of communication. By arguing that the procedure of 
communication is central to the process of action coordination, and by proposing an 
intersubjective paradigm that reveals communicative rationality, Habermas is able to 
‘reconstruct’ a critical theory which is post-metaphysical yet nondefeatist, and which 
provides us with the ability to propose democratic social activity based upon that very 
procedure of communication. As such, Habermas’s critical theory is able to avoid the 
problems associated with many of critical theories of modernity, and propose a critical 
theory that opens up a possibility for democratic society.
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Chapter 3: Paulo Freire’s Model of Critical Pedagogy
Having examined the critical theory of Jurgen Habermas in the previous chapter, I 
will now be concerned with a description and discussion of the model of critical 
pedagogy put forward in the work of Paulo Freire. This will form the foundation of my 
discussion in this thesis concerning education as a process and practice that has an 
important relationship with democracy and the possibility of democracy. My discussion 
of Freire’s work also serves importantly to draw out some of the similarities between the 
work of Habermas and Freire, and thereby to demonstrate how Freire’s model of critical 
pedagogy can be synthesized with Habermas’s critical theory, particularly through their 
theories of communication (a discussion taken up in the final chapter). While there are 
many differences between these two thinkers and their work, I endeavour to demonstrate 
that they share some fundamental ideas concerning the importance of critical thinking, 
communication, and action, and that both of their projects are concerned, in the final 
instance, with the possibility of democratic society.
Freire’s work is situated in a very different context than that of Habermas. 
Although their work starts with, and to varying degrees traces out, trajectories of critical 
modernity, Freire’s work has never moved past its Marxist foundation in the same way 
that Habermas’s has. Whereas Habermas, in tracing out the trajectory of critical 
modernity, concluded that the only way out of the theoretical dilemmas of this 
emancipatory tradition was through a postmetaphysical model of rationality (namely his 
communicative rationality) and a shift from a subject-oriented model of consciousness 
and interaction to an intersubjective one, Freire’s work has never directly dealt with these
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specific underlying philosophical questions. He does however, at least implicitly, 
recognize the importance of intersubjectivity, and his model of critical pedagogy does 
convey this. By examining Freire’s model, and demonstrating his notions of 
intersubjectivity, as well as the importance he places on specific processes of 
communication in this model, I demonstrate some of the similarities between the work of 
these two theorists, and therefore the important implications Freire’s model of critical 
pedagogy can have for Habermas’s critical theory, which to date, has not specifically 
addressed the role of education in the possibility of democratic society. Much of the 
argument concerning the similarities and implications of each work for the other is dealt 
with, as mentioned above, more specifically in the following chapter. In this chapter, I 
will simply put forward a discussion of Freire’s work, much like the discussion of 
Habermas’s work in the previous chapter.
Freire’s work, like that of Habermas, is concerned with questions of emancipation 
and the possibility of an equitable and democratic society. He begins from many of the 
same places as Habermas, that is, in the tradition of critical modernity, and largely 
inspired by Marx. His work, however, is much more explicitly concerned with practical 
and praxical dilemmas in the possibility of democratic society, and is largely 
unconcerned with questions addressing the theoretical dilemmas of critical modernity. I 
will begin this chapter with a discussion of Freire’s critical theory, as such, and the 
context and philosophical foundation upon which his model of critical pedagogy is built, 
to which I will turn later in this chapter.
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Freire’s Critical Theory
Freire’s work, like Habermas’s, is clearly the result of his specific life- 
experiences and the context of his struggles. As a result, it will be useful to briefly 
review some biographical information. During the early 1960s, Freire was involved in 
various literacy campaigns throughout rural Brazil, based at the University of Recife, and 
was closely associated with the liberation theology movement beginning to emerge in 
Latin America. In 1964, a military coup established a new government in Brazil, which 
had little use for empowering the disenfranchised and illiterate populations of Brazil, 
seeking instead to exercise power undemocratically. As a result, Freire was arrested and 
imprisoned briefly before being forced into exile from his country. It was particularly 
during the late 60s and early 70s while in exile that Freire began to write and publish his 
early works, including the seminal Pedagogy o f the Oppressed, which began to enjoy 
circulation through Europe and North America, although they were largely suppressed in 
Latin America, and particularly Brazil. In the mid-70s, he became involved in various 
education reform programs in Africa, most notably in Guinea-Bissau. During the 80s and 
90s, he continued to write, producing a series of “dialogues” or collaborative essays with 
other critical educators. From 1989 to 1991, he served as the Secretary of Education of 
the municipality of Sao Paulo.
This brief biography serves to highlight the continued concern with education and 
literacy that characterized Freire’s work throughout his life. It also demonstrates the very 
concrete nature of his experience with education and with popular struggles for freedom, 
both in and through institutions of education, as well as broader efforts to simply live in a 
democratic society. Freire’s biography is also usefully cited in other descriptions of his
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theoretical work since it is often the simplest and most direct entry into his thinking. 
Drawing from a variety of theories and influences which are not always entirely clear, 
Freire’s work is often frustrating for theoretically-inclined inquiries. His work is 
obviously influenced by his faith, and has distinct overtones of the liberation theology 
movements he was associated with. He also draws from Hegel and Marx and their 
dialectical approaches. His work has a clear association with notions of utopia and 
revolution, most likely drawn from his curious mix of Marxism and Christianity. He also 
draws at various points from some of the philosophers associated with the Frankfurt 
school (Eric Fromm’s work being among the most prominent). It is possible, however, to 
draw a relatively concise picture of Freire’s critical theory based upon certain central 
themes that are continually important and evident in his work.
Freire’s theory is most obviously Marxist in its foundation. Like Marx, Freire’s 
work situates humanity and human society in an historical context. For Freire, humans 
are conscious and historical beings who are aware of time, and can distinguish between 
the past, present and future. We know that there is a today, was a yesterday, and will be a 
tomorrow, and can situate events and activity in time. Secondly, we can conceive of 
ourselves as incomplete beings, beings continually in the process of becoming. We are 
“unfinished, uncompleted beings and with a likewise unfinished reality... [we] know 
ourselves to be unfinished; [we] are aware of our incompletion” (Freire: 1972:72). And 
finally, because of this historical context we can recognize that we live within a specific 
historical setting, “that is, within some set or other of economic, social, political, cultural, 
etc., structures and institutions...[that] is a human creation” (Lankshear, 1993:97).
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A second theme evident in Freire’s theory is the underlying dialectical
understanding he brings to much of his work. In many ways, his dialectical thinking is a
critique of the many false dichotomies that he sees in society generally and education
specifically. He is concerned with the rigid subject-object relationship he sees in
oppressive society between humanity and the world and reality it exists in, as well as
between humans in society, and again specifically between teachers and students in
education. “One cannot conceive of objectivity without subjectivity. Neither can exist
without the other, nor can they be dichotomized... rather subjectivity and objectivity
[exist] in constant dialectical relationship” (Freire, 1972:35).
A third important aspect of Freire’s theoretical work is his notion of praxis.
Praxis is the authentic dialectical relationship of action and reflection for Freire, and is
the solution to the false dichotomies of oppressive society and thinking. It is also one of
the fundamental qualities of humanity, and the core of authentic human existence. Praxis
is humanity’s true ontology, the vocation of humanization, the way we can authentically
live in and with the world. For Freire, praxis is specifically concerned with both action
and reflection. It entails not only the idea that humans are able to act upon the world, but,
because they have consciousnesses, they can also reflect upon the world, and their action
on and in the world. In this understanding of praxis action must be reflective and
reflection must be active. The two are always taken together and must always be present
for praxis to be achieved. This moment of praxis is also one of transformation: in this
dialectic of action-reflection, humanity possesses the ability to transform itself by
transforming the world and the reality in which it exists.
Men [sic], as beings of praxis, differ from animals, which are beings of pure 
activity. Animals do not consider the world; they are immersed in it. In contrast,
57
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
men emerge from the world, objectify it, and in so doing can understand it and 
transform it with their labor...men’s activity consists of action and reflection: it 
is praxis; it is to transform the world. (Freire, 1972:119)
It is also useful to note at this point that another important aspect of praxis for
Freire is its quality as critical. It is critical thinking and theory and practice. In its
dialectical moment of action-reflection and transformation, it exemplifies and reveals
human consciousness. It is not simple activism, or action without reflection and thought,
or “armchair reflection,” reflection without action. A praxical approach “sets itself the
task of demythologizing...which unveils reality...[and] makes [its participants] critical
thinkers” (Freire 1972:71). It is critical in that it reveals authentic human existence, and
aims to transform the world in which we exist.
Each of these central aspects of Freire’s theory—its historical perspective, its
dialectical approach, its orientation to praxis and critical thought—can be seen in his
concern with humanization and dehumanization. Ultimately this is Freire’s central
concern, and the foundation upon which he argues for the importance of a critical
pedagogy. Indeed, he states this theme very clearly at the very beginning of his first
major (and still among his most important) work, Pedagogy o f the Oppressed:
While the problem of humanization has always...been man’s [sic] central 
problem, it now takes on the character of an inescapable concern... It is thwarted 
by injustice, exploitation, oppression, and the violence of the oppressors; it is 
affirmed by the yearning of the oppressed for freedom and justice, and by their 
struggle to recover their lost humanity. (Freire, 1972:27-28)
For Freire, the problem is dehumanization, the negation of humanization, since
humanization “is man’s [sic] vocation” (Freire, 1972:28). Freire is concerned, then, at
the initial moment by the problem of assuring the quality of human existence, and the
struggle against its negation, a struggle against oppression. Humanization, humanity’s
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true vocation, is to achieve its conscious, historical and praxical nature and realization. It 
is to recognize the dialectical nature of the reality in which it exists, both with the world 
and with other humans, and to transform it through praxis. To this end, Freire is 
concerned finally with proposing a model of education, a critical pedagogy that is “a 
pedagogy which must be formed with, not for, the oppressed...in their incessant struggle 
to regain their humanity” (Freire, 1972:33). Before turning directly to a discussion of 
Freire’s model of critical pedagogy, let me turn to a final theme that is evident in Freire’s 
theory, a theme that is fundamental to his model of critical pedagogy, and essential to his 
emancipatory project, namely his notion of dialogue.
Freire’s Pedagogy and Dialogue
Having described some of the fundamental qualities of Freire’s critical theory 
above, let me turn now to a discussion of the importance of dialogue as a specific and 
vital element of both his critical theory generally and his critical pedagogy specifically. 
Dialogue is at least as central to Freire’s work as communication is to Habermas’s, if not 
as fundamental. Ultimately, dialogue is the most specific and important example of 
praxis for Freire. Praxis is immediately evident in dialogue. “There is no true word that 
is not at the same time a praxis. Thus, to speak a true word is to transform the world” 
(Freire, 1972:75).
Praxis is realized in the word, in dialogue. Dialogue reflects the active-reflective 
dialectic of praxis for Freire, and true dialogue must entail both. To sacrifice the active 
dimension of praxis, of the true word, is to fall into verbalism, into ‘idle chatter.’ 
Likewise, to sacrifice the dimension of reflection results in activism, “action for action’s
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sake” (Freire, 1972:75-76). Either extreme, for Freire, denies the true praxical quality of
dialogue, and therefore is not authentic dialogue. In fact, true dialogue, for Freire, is a
‘primordial right’ and an ‘existential necessity.’ To deny it, suppress it, or prevent it is to
oppress. Thus, it is impossible, in Freire’s thinking, for a model of critical theory or
critical pedagogy that is oriented towards liberation to be proposed which does not
explicitly take the process of dialogue as the central activity of education.
Dialogue must be understood as something taking part in the very historical 
nature of human beings. It is part of our historical progress in becoming human 
beings. That is, dialogue is a kind of necessary posture to the extent that humans 
become more and more critically communicative beings. Dialogue is a moment 
where humans meet to reflect on their reality as they make and remake it... 
dialogue is a challenge to existing domination. (Shor and Freire, 1987:98-99)
Dialogue is a particularly human characteristic, and is in fact necessary to the
vocation of humanization. For Freire, dialogue is more than simple communication since
it entails human consciousness and the dimensions of human existence that Freire
understands to be specific to human life. It is bound by the consciousness of history and
incompletedness; it is dialectical in its action-reflection, and as an exchange between
subjects which affects the subjects in the process of dialogue; and it is ultimately
praxical, as in dialogue, the world is transformed. In addition, “only dialogue, which is
critical thinking, is also capable of generating critical thinking” (Freire 1972:81). For
Freire, communication can be undertaken by animals, but dialogue can only be achieved
by human consciousness:
In a certain matter, for example, birds know trees. They even communicate to 
each other. They use a kind of oral and symbolic language...[but] they do not 
know that they know... On the other hand, we know that we know, and we human 
beings know also that we don’t know. Through dialogue, reflecting together on 
what we know and don’t know, we can then act critically to transform reality. 
(Shor and Freire, 1987:99)
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Dialogue is a specifically human and social form of communication in Freire’s work.
Because of its distinction as a purely human activity, and as the exemplar of
praxis, dialogue becomes central to Freire’s work and thinking. It is through dialogue
that humanity possesses the ability to transform its reality, to change the world it exists
in. This transformation, however, is the goal, not dialogue, since dialogue is part of our
authentic existence, and while dialogue is necessary, it is only the means to Freire’s goal
of transforming oppressive society into a free and democratic society. Dialogue is the
central moment of the human ontology of praxis, and must be present and engaged-in for
praxis to occur; however, dialogue and praxis are not the end of the struggle. Freire is
concerned with the struggle to achieve true dialogue and praxis, but only for the purpose
of engaging in the actual transformative activity of changing our world.
Rather than being a concept at the theoretical centre of Freire’s pedagogy, then, 
dialogue has a secondary, derivative status. Dialogue enables human beings to 
use the symbolizing power of language both to know and to transform their 
worlds. It is the knowing and the transforming that are critical, however. 
Dialogue is simply the method to achieve it. (Plumb, 1989:66)
Even though dialogue is not the ultimate goal with which Freire is concerned, it is
the specific method he understands as the path to that transformation. It does, therefore,
still remain a central aspect of Freire’s critical theory generally, and of his model of
pedagogy specifically. It is especially important to his pedagogy because of his
understanding of dialogue as praxis, because of its potential transformative power. For
Freire, then, dialogue is both an essential aspect of the design of any model of liberatory
education, and is also an important aspect of what must be taught through such a model
of education.
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Since to “say the true word—which is work, which is praxis—is to transform the 
world” (Freire, 1972:76), literacy is a vital aspect of Freire’s model of pedagogy. In 
Freire’s model, literacy is not simply a matter of learning to read and write; rather, it is to 
learn the true praxical nature of the word, of dialogue, and to realize the potential of 
transformation through this praxis of dialogue. Freire’s critical pedagogy is not simply 
concerned with teaching students how to interact objectively with the world and other 
people, but rather to change the world through dialogue with others. It is not concerned 
with simply proposing a new form of education that engages its students differently, but 
with presenting a radical and revolutionary approach to education, and social change 
generally, that realizes the praxical nature of human existence, and the transformative 
possibility of real, critical, and authentic dialogue.
Because of the centrality of his notion of dialogue, and its connection to literacy, 
we can begin to see the emergence of Freire’s model of critical pedagogy. Concerned 
with realizing the praxical quality of human existence, and through the praxical nature of 
dialogue, concerned with transforming our reality, Freire’s pedagogy presents a path 
from oppression to freedom, from dehumanization to humanization, and from slavery and 
alienation to emancipation. I will now discuss, before turning directly to practice and 
method of Freire’s critical pedagogy, the opposing model of education against which 
Freire sets his model.
Freire’s Critique of the ‘Banking Method’ of Education
This discussion of the banking method of education will serve not only as a 
background against which Freire proposes his model of critical pedagogy, but also serves
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to demonstrate the oppressive and alienating dimensions the banking method entails. It is 
these tendencies that Freire’s model is concerned with addressing in order to propose a 
model of pedagogy that leads to liberation and democracy as opposed to oppression and 
tyranny.
The banking method of education is the traditional model of education which
Freire encountered in most institutions and forums of learning in oppressive society. This
method’s initial and fundamental flaw, for Freire, is that denies the fundamental
characteristics of human existence, that it denies the human vocation of praxis and
dialogue for transformation. Initially, it treats its students as objects, as empty vessels to
be filled with knowledge, as receptacles passively accepting abstract information, to be
bank accounts into which learning is invested.
This relationship involves a narrating Subject (the teacher) and patient, listening 
objects (the students). The contents, whether values or empirical dimensions of 
reality, tend in the process of being narrated to become lifeless and petrified... 
Education thus becomes an act of depositing, in which the students are the 
depositories and the teacher is the depositor. Instead of communicating, the 
teacher issues communiques and makes deposits which the students patiently 
receive, memorize, and repeat. This is the “banking” concept of education, in 
which the scope of action allowed to the students extends only as far as receiving, 
filing, and storing deposits. (Freire, 1972:57-58)
The are two central problems with this method of teaching: the relationship between
student and teacher, and the presented relationship between humans and the world. For
Freire, both relationships are fundamentally objectifying. That is, the banking method
objectifies the students, as well as the world. This method creates a false dichotomy
between the subject-teacher and the object-students, making the teacher the principal
actor imbuing the students as objects of her or his action of teaching. The students are to
be acted upon with the instrument of knowledge, moulding them into adaptable
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individuals. And while the notion of creating adaptable individuals may sound 
reasonable, this is also a problem for Freire, because it implies the second false 
relationship inherent in the banking method, that of the objective world. For Freire, 
humanity does not simply exist in the world, but with it. “Implicit in the banking concept 
is the assumption of a dichotomy between man [sic] and the world... [where] man [sic] is 
spectator, not re-creator” (Freire, 1972:62). Such an approach denies the praxical 
ontology of humanity for Freire, the notion that we affect and are affected by the world in 
which we all always exist. We are never removed from the world, we are never in a 
position in which we can simply stand back and outside of the world so as to objectively 
affect it. So too can we never simply step outside of the world of other humans, to create 
simple subject-object relationships such as the banking method’s teacher-student 
relationship. To do so is to deny the fundamental quality of humanity, and to not act 
authentically. The banking method is fundamentally dichotomous as opposed to 
dialectical.
Ultimately, because of these false relationships implicit in the banking method, 
such an approach to education cannot fulfill the vocation of humanization. It functions, 
in fact, to deny and repress this praxical vocation, and therefore, to engage in this method 
of teaching is to act oppressively. For Freire, the banking method specifically serves the 
purposes of the oppressors since in its objectification, it encourages its students to adapt 
to the world rather than change it, to fit into the existing structure of domination and 
oppression rather than challenge it and transform it. This is the second significant failure 
of the banking approach. In its false object-subject dichotomy, it not only objectifies its 
students and encourages them to objectify the world, but it encourages them also to adapt
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to the world rather than to transform it. In the banking method the approach to education 
is that
Since men [sic] “receive” the world as passive entities, education should make 
them more passive still, and adapt them to the world. The educated man [sic] is 
the adapted man [sic], because he is better “fit” for the world. Translated into 
practice, this concept is well suited to the purposes of the oppressors, whose 
tranquility rests on how well men [sic] fit the world the oppressors have created, 
and how little they question it. (Freire, 1972:63)
Through the banking method, oppressive society possesses a powerful tool. Through this
form of education, it denies the praxical and dialectical nature of human existence in the
world, and the human ability to transform the world. Instead, this form of education acts
“with the ideological intent...of indoctrinating [the oppressed] to adapt to the world of
oppression” (Freire, 1972:65), rather than to transform it.
Finally, the banking approach to education is also guilty of being, to Freire, anti-
dialogical. This criticism is already at least implicit in the previous problems which
Freire identifies with the banking method, but it is also a specific criticism Freire raises in
its own right. The banking approach is “a one-way transaction: a monologue which
negates partnership in the social act of communication” (Lankshear 1993:100). “Banking
education attempts, by mythicizing reality, to conceal certain facts which explain the way
men [sic] exist in the world...[it] resists dialogue” (Freire, 1972:71). The method of
prescribing and dictating information to students in this approach to education does not
imply dialogue, but rather its opposite, a vertical monologue, from the teacher to the
students. By reducing education to a monological exchange, the banking method denies
the activity of dialogue, and suppresses the praxical quality of human interaction. As
such, the banking method serves again to reinforce oppressive society since, in its denial
of dialogue, it denies the transformative potential of authentic human existence.
65
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Because of its denial and suppression of the praxical vocation of human existence, 
its negation of dialogue, and because of its function to reinforce oppression, Freire is 
explicitly against this banking method of education. “Those truly committed to liberation 
must reject the banking concept in its entirety, adopting instead a concept of men [sic] as 
conscious beings, and consciousness as consciousness intent upon the world” (Freire, 
1972:66). As opposed to the banking method, Freire’s work is concerned with proposing 
and developing a model of education that does fulfill the human vocation, that 
problematizes the relationship between humanity and its existence with the world, and 
that realizes the human potential to transform their reality. This model is Freire’s critical 
pedagogy, to which I will now turn.
Freire’s Critical Pedagogy
Critical pedagogy is essentially the diametric opposite of the banking method. It 
takes as its starting point the human ontology of praxis, that idea that humans exist with 
the world and each other, and that to objectify either is to deny this fundamental 
characteristic of humanity. It is “education as the practice of freedom—as opposed to 
education as the practice of domination— [and] denies that man [sic] is abstract, isolated, 
independent, and unattached to the world; it also denies that the world exists as a reality 
apart from men” (Freire, 1972:69). Instead of teaching students to adapt and conform to 
the objective world, critical pedagogy is concerned with revealing to its participants their 
consciousness in the world, and their ability to change the world, to transform it. Critical 
pedagogy also rejects the subject-object dichotomy of the teacher-student relationship. In 
Freire’s model, a teacher is no longer simply the authority, the bearer of knowledge who
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deposits this knowledge into her students as objects upon which to act. Both teacher and 
student are assumed to be in a relationship in which each must be conscious of and learn 
from the other. For Freire, a critical pedagogue “constantly re-forms his [sic] reflections 
in the reflection of the students. The students—no longer docile listeners—are now 
critical co-investigators in dialogue with the teacher” (Freire, 1972:68). The relationships 
assumed and purported by the banking method are completely rejected in Freire’s model 
and the central concern of education is no longer abstract knowledge and objectification, 
but instead it is critical reflection and action in order to transform the world through 
praxis and dialogue.
As an entry into Freire’s model of critical pedagogy, it will be useful to examine
some of the methods proposed in this model, methods which are, again, diametrically
opposed to those employed in the banking method of education which reaffirms
oppression rather than freedom. Specifically, there are three central aspects of Freire’s
approach that demonstrate the goals and characteristics of Freire’s pedagogy: namely,
that critical pedagogy is dialogical, critical, and transformative.
The first aspect of Freire’s pedagogy I will look at here is his methodology of
generative themes, an aspect which reflects the fundamentally dialogical nature of this
model. This generative themes approach is concerned with developing a language of
interaction, a context in which to undertake this critical pedagogy with the people,
addressing their situation and their concerns.
It is not our role to speak to the people about our own view of the world, nor to 
attempt to impose that view on them, but rather to dialogue with the people about 
their view and ours... The language of the educator or the politician (and it seems 
more and more clear that the latter must also become an educator, in the broadest 
sense of the word), like the language of the people, cannot exist without thought;
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and neither language nor thought can exist without a structure to which they refer.
(Freire, 1972:85)
Freire’s model, because of its dialogical quality, is concerned with addressing the actually 
existing system of oppression and concerns of the people. But in order to do so, the 
critical pedagogue cannot simply descend from above into the situation, bearing all the 
knowledge and language necessary to lead the people through their oppression into 
freedom. Rather, the critical pedagogue must be concerned with the problem of 
humanization, and allow her or his students to define and establish the situation which 
forms the context for the dialogue of critical pedagogy to arrive at this fundamental issue. 
Specifically, through this generative themes methodology, “the task of the dialogical 
teacher...working on the thematic universe revealed by...investigation is to ‘re-present’ 
that universe to the people from whom he [sic] first received it—and to ‘re-present’ it not 
as a lecture, but as a problem” (Freire, 1972:101). Specifically, Freire’s model envisions 
a period of initial study simply of the student’s way of life and language, their situation, 
before even beginning to engage directly in teaching. It is during this initial period that 
the critical pedagogue must work to understand the situation and context of his or her 
students, and to understand the background from which they are coming. By doing so, 
the critical pedagogue can engage the students in dialogue that is not simply abstract and 
removed from their situation, but is instead directly addressing their situation and context, 
and posing it as a problem, as the object of their dialogue which they can begin to 
change.
This notion of generative themes, for Freire, “can be located in concentric circles, 
moving from the general to the particular” with the most basic and general generative 
theme being the problem of domination (Freire, 1972:93). It is also concerned with
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moving through these levels of generative themes, from the general to the specific, and 
vice versa, but only as these themes are developed by the students themselves from their 
own situation. Such a methodology and approach to education clearly demonstrates and 
ensures the dialogical quality of its practice and avoids “the risk of either ‘banking’ or of 
preaching in the desert” (Freire, 1972:85). “Because this view of education starts with 
the conviction that it cannot present its own program but must search for this program 
dialogically with the people, it serves to introduce the pedagogy of the oppressed, in the 
elaboration of which the oppressed must participate” (Freire, 1972:118).
The second aspect of Freire’s model of critical pedagogy that I would like to 
discuss is the notion of ‘conscientizagao. ’ Loosely translated as ‘consciousness raising’ 
or ‘conscientization,’ it is this element of Freire’s pedagogy that reveals its critical quality 
and concerns. “Conscientization describes the...processes through which the dominated 
become aware of the blocked subjectivities related to shared experience” and answers one 
of the central questions of Freire’s pedagogy, “how is it that learners can escape from the 
culture of silence, take steps toward critical consciousness, and enter into authentic 
dialogue” (Morrow and Torres, 2002:103). This process addresses one of the specific 
goals of critical pedagogy: to reveal the false dichotomies of oppressive society and 
instill an awareness and realization of the praxical nature of humanity. It is in this 
concept of conscientization that we can specifically see the critical nature of Freire’s 
pedagogical project. While at least implicit in many of the other aspects of his theory, by 
making conscientization a specific goal of his pedagogy, Freire proposes an educational 
model that demythologizes the purported reality of oppressive society, and that addresses 
the false consciousness of domination and dehumanization. Conscientization is
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essentially Freire’s expression of critical thinking, and “does not stop at the level of mere
subjective perception of a situation, but through action prepares men [sic] for the struggle
against the obstacles to their humanization” (Freire, 1972:112). Freire’s pedagogical
project is concerned with achieving conscientization in its students, in enabling them to
realize their authentic praxical nature, through dialogue, and to engage with others and
the world in order to transform the world.
Finally, a third aspect of Freire’s pedagogy, namely the idea of cultural action for
freedom, can be discussed to demonstrate the transformative orientation of this model.
Freire’s cultural action for freedom is the ultimate goal of his pedagogical project, and
the highest level of his pedagogy. It is this moment that he seeks to achieve through his
model of critical pedagogy, and it is through this action that humanization is realized for
Freire. This level of Freire’s pedagogy brings the other aspects of his model together into
a model for social change that is realized through his pedagogical project. It entails the
notions of dialogue and generative themes, and is oriented to conscientization; it is
opposed to domination and oppression, society that denies the process of humanization,
the so-called ‘culture of silence’:
Whereas cultural action for freedom is characterized by dialogue, and its pre­
eminent purpose is to conscientize people, cultural action for domination is 
opposed to dialogue and serves to domesticate the people. The former 
problematizes, the latter sloganizes...Cultural action for freedom can be satisfied 
neither with ‘the mystifications of ideology’...nor with ‘a simple moral 
denunciation of myths and errors,’ but must undertake a ‘rational and rigorous 
critique’ of ideology. The fundamental role...[of this approach is to] invite the 
people to grasp with their minds the truth of their reality... in problematizing and 
conscientizing cultural action for freedom [is] the annunciation of a new reality 
[that] is the historical project proposed for men’s [sic] achievement. (Freire, 
1985:85-86)
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Since Freire’s pedagogy is concerned with revealing the true nature of human existence 
to its students, to encourage them through dialogue to understand the praxical quality of 
dialogue and their own existence, and through this praxical nature, to transform the 
world, he is ultimately concerned with this ‘cultural action for freedom.’ Qualified as 
‘cultural’ since this model is concerned with developing the praxical and dialogical 
quality of human life from the oppressed’s own situation, rather than by imposing a 
language and philosophy of the world upon them, Freire’s goal, particularly through his 
methodology of generative themes, is to arm the oppressed with their own awareness and 
critical consciousness of the world so that they can struggle against it in order to 
transform it. “Thus, cultural action for freedom, which characterized the movement that 
struggled for the realization of what was announced, must then transform itself into 
permanent cultural revolution” (Freire, 1985:86). Cultural action for freedom is the 
(continual) moment of transformation in Freire’s pedagogical project. Having realized 
their true nature as praxical beings through dialogue, critically examined the reality in 
which they exist, and become aware of their ability to change it, the oppressed struggle 
for their humanization, and transform the culture of silence into cultural action for 
freedom, that ‘permanent cultural revolution’ that ensures the vocation of humanization 
for all society, that creates a society of freedom from oppression.
This is, then, Freire’s model of critical pedagogy, which is ultimately a 
pedagogical project for social transformation through education. Freire’s project is 
concerned with education as the entry point into the existing systems of oppression, and, 
writ large, proposes this pedagogical entry point as the seed for transformative social 
change. Concerned with revealing the true nature of humanity and human existence in
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and with the world, through dialogue, Freire’s pedagogy proposes to empower its 
students with the knowledge and ability to engage the world with others in order to 
transform it, continually, into a free society, into an authentic democracy.
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Chapter 4: Conclusion: From Education to Democracy
Having examined the work of Jurgen Habermas and Paulo Freire in the preceding 
two chapters, using their own distinctive conceptual inventories and analytical 
vocabularies, I will now recapitulate in detail the central argument of this thesis, the 
reconciliation of these two thinkers in the context of the relationship between education 
and democracy. As stated at different points previously, and demonstrated in the 
discussion of their respective work, Habermas and Freire offer different approaches to 
different problems. They are both, however, concerned in one central respect with a very 
similar problem: the potential of humanity and human society to achieve a more free and 
democratic order. Both are concerned with existing systems of domination, and with the 
alienation of human existence from its true potential, its authentic existence. Both are 
concerned, in the final instance, with the question of democracy: what is real democracy, 
where does it come from, and how do we get there?
While Habermas’s work is concerned with a reconstruction of critical theory to 
demonstrate the importance and centrality of communication, both to rationality and to 
action, in order to demonstrate how the distortion and suppression of communicative 
rationality and action has lead to alienation and irrational and undemocratic society, it has 
not dealt specifically or directly with the question of education. On the other hand, while 
Freire’s work is concerned with proposing a model of critical pedagogy that is concerned 
with ‘conscientizing’ its students through dialogue to engage in cultural action for 
freedom, he has not specifically dealt with some of the underlying problems of such a 
critical approach (or critical theory generally), and places the goal of humanization and
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free society above his method of dialogue. In this chapter, then, I will address these 
‘gaps’ in each respective thinker, and how their works can be reconciled to demonstrate 
the importance of a critical model of education to the possibility of democracy.
Initially, it will be useful to highlight the similarities of their works, and to draw 
some parallels between Freire’s and Habermas’s theories. By returning to the different 
aspects of their respective works described in the previous chapters, I will demonstrate 
the affinities between some of the underlying concepts guiding their theory. By doing so, 
I will begin to match up their respective work, demonstrating the possibility of 
reconciling them. At the heart of this reconciliation will be a discussion of their 
respective notions of communication, which is central to both, but in different ways 
which has specific effects upon their projects. Such a discussion will demonstrate the 
usefulness of integrating Freire’s critical pedagogy into Habermas’s critical theory of 
society, and show how doing so will fill the ‘gaps’ both in Freire’s work, and in 
Habermas’s. Let me turn, now, to a discussion of the various ‘parallel’ aspects of the 
respective works of Habermas and Freire.
The Unfinished Project of Humanization
As a first general parallel between the works of these two thinkers, it will be 
useful to start with a discussion of the problems both set up as a starting point for their 
respective projects. Habermas’s central project can said to be concerned with what he 
describes as the unfinished project of modernity. Beginning with a concern for the 
trajectory of critical modernity, and the theoretical dilemmas he sees it falling into, 
Habermas is initially involved with proposing a critical theory that does not prematurely
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deny the emancipatory potential of the modernist project of enlightenment and critique. 
Responding to both the critical theories of his own predecessors at the Frankfurt school, 
as well as the various post- attacks on the enlightenment project and modernity, 
Habermas’s theoretical project seeks to recuperate the potential of modernity, and realize 
it as an emancipatory project. Taking to heart the concerns of critical theorists before 
him, he is concerned with the modem project of rejecting arbitrary and abstract 
metaphysical models of existence and action in order to replace them instead with an 
understanding of communicative rationality as the guiding force in human activity. 
Through the socio-cultural transformations of modernity, humanity has become 
responsible for its own destiny, and is no longer bound to justifications outside of itself. 
Modem society, being rational, can no longer uncritically accept explanations based on 
fate, destiny or any other abstract, external, and irrational existence outside of itself. We 
are now dependent on the force of reason for justification of our actions.
This modem paradigm is ultimately emancipatory, for Habermas. It is, however, 
an unfinished project, for Habermas, so long as we fail to realize the various dimensions 
of rationality that now govern this paradigm. Specifically, Habermas is concerned with 
the previous work of critical modernity and its understanding of rationality in purely 
instrumental terms. Such an understanding leads to the pessimism of Horkheimer and 
Adorno’s work, for example, as well as the relativistic critiques against modernism 
levelled by post-structuralist and post-modernist philosophers. Habermas’s critical 
theory can be seen as an attempt to reveal another, more fundamental, form of rationality 
at the heart of the modern project, namely communicative rationality. Revealing 
communicative rationality as the initial and most fundamental form of rationality, it
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becomes possible also to realize the truly emancipatory potential of the modernist 
paradigm.
Habermas remains convinced that it is possible to continue the project of the 
Enlightenment... [and] hope to continue the project of a critical theory of society 
without relying on the various kinds of metaphysical projections to which he 
believes his forerunners in the tradition succumbed... [insisting instead] on the 
possibility of a conception of reason that is postmetaphysical yet nondefeatist... 
[a] communicative rationality [that] falls prey neither to the repressive 
objectivism...of the Enlightenment... nor to the perils of relativism. (Cooke, 
1994:x-xi)
Habermas’s primary goal, then, is to reveal the operation of a form of rationality that 
realizes and can achieve the emancipatory potential of the modem project, that points 
towards the possibility of democratic society.
Freire’s central concern, on the other hand, is what he describes as the problem of 
dehumanization. Not particularly concerned with the philosophical dilemmas of theories 
of critical modernity, Freire is concerned instead with the society of oppression and 
domination which he sees around him, and against which he worked. Witnessing the 
destitution and exploitation of the majority of the people of his own native country, as 
well as others, Freire’s project is concerned with addressing this society of oppression, 
and providing a path for the oppressed to stmggle against their dehumanization, realizing 
their tme vocation of humanization. Central to this project is Freire’s understanding of 
human existence, and what he understands as living authentically. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, this understanding entails a notion of humanity as historical and 
praxical, always incomplete, but realizing this incompletion in the dialectic of action and 
reflection, in praxis, and through dialogue, transforming the world into a reality that 
allows this continuing vocation of humanization. While Freire’s concern is also about 
realizing an emancipatory project, he is much less concerned with how this project has
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been formed in the context of modernity, but rather sees the vocation of humanization as 
the goal of human existence, as part of the very nature of humanity. Freire’s 
emancipatory project is immediate and immanent, always available in the nature of 
authentic human existence, and he is concerned with revealing this authentic existence 
through a model of critical pedagogy as a means to achieve the struggle against 
oppression, and to achieve a democratic society.
Ultimately, both Habermas and Freire are concerned with developing a theoretical 
framework that allows for the realization of human emancipation from irrational and 
alienating or oppressive society. Both are approaches couched in a concern for realizing 
the basic moment of human existence and society, understood as praxis for Freire, and as 
communicative rationality and action for Habermas. While their context is quite 
different, their goals and projects are directed towards the same result: realizing an 
unfinished project of emancipation, and revealing the possibility for emancipation in 
those as yet unrealized projects. Let me now summarize the specific ‘parallels’ between 
their respective works, as described in previous chapters.
Habermas and Freire: Dimensions of Process
While their goals are fundamentally compatible, it will be useful to recall some of 
the specific aspects of the processes entailed in each theorist’s work to reinforce my 
argument that Habermas and Freire can be theoretically reconciled. There are three 
moments of intersection that I will specifically address in this section, namely the 
relationship between Habermas’s method of reconstruction and Freire’s method of 
generative themes; Habermas’s pragmatics and Freire’s praxis; and finally Habermas’s
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communicative action and Freire’s cultural action for freedom. These three ‘parallel’ 
aspects of their theories will serve to demonstrate the theoretical affinity between the 
work of Habermas and Freire.
1. Reconstructive Science and Generative Themes. One of the main parallels 
that can be identified between the work of Habermas and Freire is the methodology 
employed in their respective projects. For Habermas, this methodological question takes 
the form of his notion of reconstructive science. As described in chapter two, 
Habermas’s project revolves around an attempt to provide a solution to the dilemmas of 
critical modernity as a result of its reliance on a subject-oriented paradigm of rationality. 
In order to solve this dilemma, he must demonstrate that another form of rationality is at 
work in the modem paradigm, namely inter subjective communicative rationality. 
Habermas’s path to proving this lies along a rational reconstruction of the pragmatics of 
communication. By examining the implicit (and explicit) validity claims raised and 
redeemed (or rejected) in the everyday use of language, Habermas contends that it is 
possible to identify a validity basis of speech that demonstrates a communicative 
rationality at work. With this methodology, Habermas examines the actual use of 
language in conversation, as well as reconstructing the underlying explicit or implicit 
validity claims raised by an utterance. Through this method of reconstmctive science, 
Habermas reconstructs the communicative rationality and action potentially at work in 
the everyday use of language and social interaction, that make action coordination 
possible by means other than coercion.
The methodology employed in Freire’s pedagogical process is his generative 
themes methodology. Similar to Habermas, the object of this methodology is the
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examination and use of everyday language, and the specific situation and world-view it 
implies. Freire’s generative themes approach is concerned with constructing a language 
in which to perform his pedagogical project, using the language of the people, of the 
students of critical pedagogy, to pose its implicit world-view as a problem which the 
students must address. Freire’s generative themes methodology is concerned with taking 
the language used by the people, and ‘re-presenting’ it to them in order to reveal the 
world-view it implies, and to allow the students to realize that dialogue has the potential 
to change their situation, their world, through the language they use. He is concerned 
with generating the implicit themes of the existing situation of his students through their 
language, and explicitly posing those themes as situations to be addressed and 
transformed.
Both of these methodological approaches are directed towards an examination of 
language, and specifically language-in-use, in order to reconstruct the implicit and 
explicit underlying assumptions and claims made by and in that use of language. While 
situated at different theoretical levels within their respective projects, these two notions 
of reconstructive science and generative themes present a clear parallel, at the level of the 
pragmatics of communication, between the work of Habermas and Freire in their 
respective projects of realizing an emancipatory society.
2. Pragmatics and Praxis. A second parallel that can be identified in these 
separate works lies in their usage of notions of pragmatics and praxis. These are, 
respectively, central concepts in Habermas’s and Freire’s theories. For Habermas, 
pragmatics, and specifically his theory of formal pragmatics, forms the central moment of 
his theory of language. Habermas is concerned with pragmatics for several reasons,
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described above in chapter two. Habermas takes up pragmatics as the basis for his theory 
of communication because of its understanding of language as action, of speech as 
utterance or speech act. For Habermas, the importance of this pragmatic approach is that 
it reveals the validity basis of language in use, and also demonstrates communicative 
rationality. It is this notion of communicative rationality (and communicative action 
generated from communicative rationality) that forms the centre of Habermas’s critical 
project, his concern with the unfinished project of modernity. For Habermas, pragmatics, 
as a theory of language and communication, reveals the promise of this dialogical form of 
rationality for realizing the unfinished project of modernity. Through his pragmatic 
approach to language, Habermas is able to argue that communicative rationality is the 
initial and fundamental form of rationality, and that this form of rationality holds the 
potential for a communicative and consensual social organization, that it can form the 
underlying competences upon which to build democratic society.
For Freire, praxis serves a function similarly central to his theory as pragmatics is 
for Habermas’s. In Freire’s theory, praxis in the true ontological vocation of humanity, 
and to exist authentically is to realize this praxis. This notion of praxis is conceived of as 
a dialectic of action and reflection, and is specifically revealed in dialogue, the moment at 
which humanity acts and reflects upon the world which it can transform. Dialogue, then, 
becomes the specific and central example of praxis, and presents the starting point of 
both conscientization and its realization. It is also in dialogue that humans realize their 
authentic existence, and their ability to transform the world with others. This notion of 
praxis, this activity of praxis, is central to Freire’s pedagogical project, since he is 
concerned both to reveal this praxical nature to his students, as well as to have them
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engage in praxis (through dialogue), to struggle for humanization, to transform their 
reality. Freire’s praxis, like Habermas’s pragmatics, is concerned with providing the 
moment of possibility for change, and the opening towards his emancipatory intent.
We can see then, that these notions of pragmatics and praxis, which are 
fundamental to each theorist’s work, run deeply parallel to one another, both in the 
function they serve in their respective theoretical apparata, and in the resolution of the 
problems arising in each theorist’s project. Both are concerned with communication, and 
communication (or dialogue) in use, as an activity that reveals the underlying quality of 
human existence, and, when realized, provides the potential for their emancipatory 
projects.
3. Communicative Action and Cultural Action for Freedom. Finally, 
Habermas’s concept of communicative action and Freire’s notion of cultural action for 
freedom mark another important parallel between their respective works. These concepts 
also serve in many ways as the capstone to the respective theories, being the final 
expression of their associated projects. The theoretical culmination of Habermas’s 
project is expressed in his theory of communicative action. It is this form of social action 
which constitutes the emancipatory promise of the enlightenment and modernity. 
Grounded in communicative rationality, and demonstrated through his theory of formal 
pragmatics (as a reconstruction of language-in-use), communicative action is that social 
action which demonstrates the democratic potential of communicative rationality. It is 
action coordinated communicatively, following justified validity claims, and not 
strategically, at the expense of legitimate agreement. Communicative action is action 
governed by communicative rationality, and coordinated through valid discourse. Such
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action addresses all of the participants in its activity, and its achievement ensures their 
consent and agreement with the action undertaken. It is, as such, a highly democratic 
notion of social action, and is, in fact, ultimately concerned with ensuring this democratic 
aspect.25 It is specifically opposed to Habermas’s notion of strategic action as 
undemocratic social action, action undertaken which does not adhere to communicative 
rationality or the rigours of valid discourse, whose procedure of reaching agreement is, 
therefore, not democratic. It is in this aspect of Habermas’s critical project (that is, in 
communicative action) that the possibility of democratic society is demonstrated, and 
through which a moment of democratic action and social organization and coordination is 
proposed.
Freire’s cultural action for freedom, likewise, presents the end which Freire seeks 
to achieve through his project and model of critical pedagogy. Cultural action for 
freedom is, in a word, what Freire’s critical pedagogy is about. Through his 
methodology of generative themes, Freire is concerned with developing a process of 
education that reveals, through dialogue, the praxical nature of human existence, and the 
problem of dehumanization and domination that faces humans as the struggle they must 
engage in order to achieve a society that allows the pursuit of humanization. Cultural 
action for freedom is that praxical action achieved through dialogue which transforms the 
world from a society of oppression and domination into an emancipated society that 
allows for authentic human existence. Through his pedagogical project, Freire is 
concerned with using peoples’ own language and their own situation to pose this reality
25 This democratic dimension o f Habermas’s work is specifically developed through his theory o f discourse 
ethics. Habermas’s discourse ethics also demonstrates the internal connection between communicative 
action and democracy (i.e., when an agreement based on the force of argument (and guided by
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as a problem which confronts them so long as it prevents their humanization, and to 
reveal to them, through dialogue, the praxical nature of human existence, and the 
possibility, indeed the necessity, of transforming this. This moment of praxical 
transformation of reality from oppression to humanization is what Freire describes as 
cultural action for freedom.
These specific notions of communicative action and cultural action for freedom 
demonstrate the theoretical parallels and similarities between the works of Habermas and 
Freire. These two concepts of action, both serving as the culmination of their respective 
theories, demonstrate the concern for the achievement of an emancipatory and democratic 
society that both theorists share. Describing a moment of social organization and action 
that provides the potential for realizing their respective projects, communicative action 
and cultural action for freedom demonstrate the strong similarities between the work of 
these two thinkers. Let me turn now to a discussion of some of the ‘gaps’ in the work of 
each theorist, with an eye to how these gaps can be filled by making a theoretical 
connection between their respective projects.
Habermas and Freire: Theoretical ‘Gaps’
Mainly, I am concerned with the gap in Habermas’s (otherwise) complex and 
immense theoretical project left by the lack of any significant discussion of the 
importance of education, as either a process or an institution in society that affects the 
overall intent of this project, namely the possibility of democracy. I am not concerned at 
this point, however, with his failure to treat education at the institutional level of his
communicative rationality) is reached, the procedures which precede this moment o f agreement are the 
procedures o f  democracy). See the discussion o f discourse ethics in Chapter 2.
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theory, but rather at the interactive and procedural level, at the micro-social level (which 
ultimately connects to the macro-institutional level).
On the other hand, I am concerned with the gap in Freire’s work at the 
foundational level of his project. While his work goes to great lengths to develop an 
argument concerning the authentically dialogical nature of human existence, the implied 
intersubjectivity of this approach, with the lack of an intersubjective theoretical 
grounding, is a serious flaw with his approach. I will argue that both of these gaps can be 
filled by reconciling these two theoretical projects, and that such a reconciliation will also 
demonstrate the important relationship between education and democracy, the important 
role that education plays in the possibility of achieving democratic society.
Let me turn first to a discussion of the ‘gap’ in Habermas’s work. Concerned 
initially with developing a theory of communication that reveals his concept of 
communicative rationality as the most fundamental form of rationality, Habermas’s 
critical theory is also a theory of society and social organization. He is concerned, not 
only with a theory of communication, and communicative rationality, but also 
communicative action, and social organization through communicative rationality. From 
his theorization of social action coordinated according to different forms of rationality, 
Habermas develops an argument concerning institutional development and differentiation 
in modem society.
Simply put, this approach contends that as the rationalizing processes of capitalist 
development and modernization unfold, different social institutions arise to deal with the 
differentiated social activities entailed by its rising division of labour. Institutions can be 
described and are differentiated by the rationality guiding their activities. Again, I am not
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specifically concerned with this institutional level of analysis in this thesis, but it is useful 
to briefly describe this dimension of Habermas’s theory in order to make my point 
concerning the ‘gap’ of education in his work.
One social institution that Habermas is directly concerned with is the institution of 
law. Concerned with how this institution is also intimately linked to the possibility of 
democracy, Habermas has produced a sustained and intricate examination of this 
institution, examining the various rationalities at work in it, and how these rationalities 
effect the possibility of realizing a democratic government and society. This treatment 
also examines the specific communicative and interactive procedures at the heart of the 
processes of this institution.
The specific ‘gap’ in Freire’s work, however, is more significant to his overall 
theory, and a somewhat more complex gap to deal with. Specifically, while Freire’s 
work is centrally concerned with dialogue, and at least implies an intersubjective notion 
of rationality, he does not specifically develop the philosophy-of-language foundations of 
his argument. Concerned with issues of humanization and dehumanization, oppression 
and the oppressed, Freire ultimately does not provide an explanation for these categories 
and distinctions. He does not address questions about where oppression comes from, 
how the ‘oppressors’ come to their position of power and dominance, for example. His 
approach also at least implies some notion of inter subjectivity (particularly demonstrated 
in the central notion of dialogue in Freire’s work) although he fails to ground it
26 This examination is taken up in Habermas’s Between Facts and Norms (1998).
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theoretically in any adequate way, and which, in fact, contradicts other aspects of his 
theory.27
Let me turn to a brief discussion of how the work of Habermas can be used to fill
98these ‘gaps’ in Freire’s work. The fundamental gap in Freire’s philosophy can be 
identified in the subjectivistic onto logically motivated grounding of his work. “His 
strategy of anchoring an emancipatory pedagogy in an ontologically conceived notion of 
the person [can be] viewed as unsound” (Plumb, 1989:73). By subjectivistically 
ontologically grounding his argument, Freire undercuts the moments of intersubjectivity 
that he raises throughout his model, and ultimately succumbs to a subjectivist paradigm 
that will ultimately entail many of the problems associated with (subject-oriented) critical 
modernity. By doing so, we will fall into the problem of a subject-object relationship as a 
description of human reality, and will be unable to reach an understanding of 
(Habermas’s) communicative rationality, and instead be confined to an instrumental
9Qrationality as the guiding force behind human understanding and activity. Freire’s 
reliance on dialectics clearly reveals this subject-object orientation in his work, that is,
27 By failing to treat dialogue as a central part of his project (rather than as more o f a method) Freire is able 
to avoid the contradiction implied by the intersubjectivity of his perspective on dialogue and the overall 
subjectivist orientation o f his project as a whole. That is, he tries to include an intersubjectivist model of  
dialogue as a method in his overall subject-oriented project of critical pedagogy. Since his pedagogy is 
subject-oriented, the implied intersubjectivity o f dialogue is never explicitly addressed, and no really 
philosophical grounding is provided for this process o f intersubjective dialogue. The philosophical 
foundations o f Freire’s work is, rather, concerned with supporting his subjectivist approach.
28 In order to take up this discussion concerning these ‘gaps’ in Freire’s work, I will turn to some o f the 
discussion developed in Plumb’s thesis (1989). Plumb’s work is concerned also with a reconciliation o f  
Freire and Habermas, although his reconciliation is concerned with providing some o f the theoretical 
foundations to Freire’s work using Habermas. That is, his approach is concerned with using Habermas to 
fill the gaps in Freire’s work only, taking the rest o f Freire’s project as is. While I am concerned also with 
making an argument concerning how Freire’s work can provide an understanding o f education to the 
possibility o f  democracy to Habermas critical theory, Plumb’s thesis is useful, and I will draw from parts 
his argument to fill out this discussion.
29 That is, Freire’s subject-centred reason is a failure to fully thematize intersubjectivity. Following
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the primary relation is between subject and object, not between one subject and 
another. There is no direct bond between subjects co-intending on a common 
objective reality. Beings of praxis are ultimately beings-in-the-world not beings- 
together. (Plumb, 1989:110)
While Freire’s work places a significant emphasis on dialogue, because of his 
reliance on this subjectivist paradigm, he is unable to realize the true moment of dialogue, 
of discourse, namely as a moment of intersubjective exchange and communication. 
Thus, the praxical moment of dialogue, as transformative, will also entail the subject- 
speaker transforming the object-hearer, and there is not space in Freire’s approach for 
theoretically understanding participants in dialogue as subjects engaging one another, 
though his practice emphasizes precisely this. Freire seems to want to be able to argue 
this, and at least implies it, but by his reliance on this subject-oriented approach, he is 
ultimately unable to do so. However, through a reconciliation to Habermas, this gap in 
Freire’s work can be filled, and it becomes possible to maintain the central arguments of 
Freire’s project while grounding them in an intersubjectivist approach that recognizes 
communicative rationality as the fundamental form of rationality at work in modem 
society. This reconciliation will also, then, as mentioned above, be able to provide 
Habermas’s critical theory of society with a treatment of education, a treatment which 
reveals the vital relationship between education and democracy, and provides an 
argument concerning the importance of a model of critical pedagogy for achieving a 
democratic society. Let me turn, then, to this reconciliation, beginning with Freire, and
Hegel and Marx, it would have been a matter o f not swallowing the intuition concerning the 
ethical totality back into the horizon of the self-reference o f the knowing and acting subject, but of 
explicating it in accord with the model o f unconstrained consensus formation in a communication 
community standing together under cooperative constraints... I have already suggested that the 
paradigm o f the knowledge o f objects has to be replaced by the paradigm o f mutual understanding 
between subjects capable o f speech and action. Hegel and Marx did not achieve this paradigm- 
change [nor does Freire]. (Habermas, 1987a:295-6)
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filling the ‘gaps’ in his theory with Habermas, which will then allow me to use Freire’s 
critical project to fill the ‘gap’ in Habermas’s work.
Reconstructing Freire: The Intersection of Dialogue
The specific opening which allows a possible reconciliation between the work of 
Freire and Habermas is revealed in the moment of dialogue in Freire’s critical 
pedagogy.30 By taking this moment of dialogue, it will be possible to use Habermas to 
reconstruct Freire in order to solve some of the dilemmas evident in Freire’s work, and 
move towards making a connection between them that allows Freire’s project to be 
incorporated into Habermas’s in order to address the absence of education in his work.
Freire’s notion of dialogue, as discussed in the previous chapter, is a central 
concept and process in his model of critical pedagogy. It is through dialogue that humans 
realize their true praxical nature, and that they realize the possibility to transform their 
world. It is only, however, as mentioned previously, a method to Freire’s ultimate goal 
of transformative social change, or his cultural action for freedom. It does not constitute 
a fundamental aspect of his theory, albeit a central one. This moment of dialogue at least 
implies a notion of intersubjectivity, and Freire seems to want to be able to pose dialogue 
as a moment of beings-together in dialogue. He is, however, prevented from being able 
to realize this because of the subjectivist ontological basis of his theory, and the 
dialectical quality of his project. He is instead in a position of contradiction: seeking
That is, while Freire is concerned, specifically following Marx, with providing a response to oppression, his 
failure to realize an intersubjective foundation for his work marks a theoretical ‘gap.’
30 The approach to this reconciliation that I am taking here is again informed by Plumb’s work, although 
my focus upon dialogue as the opening is different than Plumb’s approach, which approaches this 
reconciliation from different angles (i.e., from a systems-lifeworld approach, from a critique o f the 
subjectivist paradigm, and from a critique of instrumental rationality). See chapter 7, “Toward a 
Reconstruction o f Freire’s Pedagogical Thought” in Plumb, 1989.
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inter subjectivity through dialogue, but being confined to a subjectivist paradigm 
throughout the rest of his theory as a result of the ontological foundations of his work. In 
order to solve this problem with his theory, it would be necessary to adopt an 
intersubjective orientation as the foundation of his theory, one that would invalidate its 
existing ontological orientation, and the need for it, without jettisoning the critical nature 
and revolutionary intent of his project. In order to do this, we can turn to Habermas’s 
theory in order to provide such an intersubjective foundation, one which still is of critical 
intent.
Freire is ultimately concerned with the problem of humanization, of seeking to 
ensure a social system in which humans are able to realize their nature as beings of 
praxis. The true moment of this realization is, for Freire, specifically revealed in the 
process of dialogue. We can take Freire’s model of critical pedagogy, then, as an attempt 
to generate a situation in which true dialogue can occur, and through this moment of true 
dialogue, the participants of his model can realize themselves as beings of praxis, thereby 
pursuing their true vocation of humanization. If we take this moment of dialogue in 
Freire’s theory as its central moment as opposed to simply its method, we can be begin to 
reformulate his theory upon an intersubjective foundation. Taking Habermas’s formal 
pragmatic theory of communication, we can argue that this understanding of 
communication exemplifies Freire’s concern with arguing that dialogue is the central 
moment of praxis. Habermas’s pragmatics take communication as the starting point for 
coordinating social action, and specifically takes up intersubjectivity as its foundation. 
Substituting Habermas’s notion of intersubjective communication for Freire’s dialogue 
still allows the central moment of praxis in Freire’s theory, but makes its realization
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through communication the foundation of the project as opposed to praxis being the goal 
and dialogue simply being the method to its achievement. Habermas’s pragmatics 
collapses the two, making it impossible to achieve any intentional form of coordinated 
action in the absence of some form of communication, but also highlighting the active 
quality of communication. Dialogue or communication, then, becomes the initial 
moment of praxis, or indeed, any form of social action.
Such an approach still fulfills the critical intent of Freire’s project. This can be 
seen by returning to his criticism of the banking method of education. One of Freire’s 
central criticism with this approach is that it is anti-dialogical, positioning the teacher as 
the subject, and the students as objects, passively receiving and absorbing knowledge 
invested in them by the teacher. Such a relationship in monological, not dialogical, and 
posits a subject-object relationship. By adopting dialogue as the foundation of his critical 
pedagogy, we can take up this same criticism, posing the problem of the banking method 
as its denial of the intersubjective quality of true dialogue or communication. By 
adopting a model of education that does take (intersubjective) dialogue or communication 
as its foundation, we can move past the problems of a banking model of education, and 
propose a critical pedagogy. Such a communicatively-grounded critical pedagogy would 
continue to be explicitly dialogue-oriented, and would still reveal the moment of praxis in 
human existence; through communication or dialogue, humanity coordinates its actions 
for social activity and change, transformation. The moment of authentic human existence 
is still revealed in a critical pedagogy that takes intersubjective communication as its 
foundation. But instead of starting with an ontological foundation in which dialogue is 
simply a method for achieving the strategic goals of a subject-centred reason, the
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positions are reversed, so that intersubjective communication is the foundation and in this 
process of communication, the nature of human existence is revealed, and the possibility 
of consensual social action, rationally coordinated through communication, is realized.
By adopting Habermas’s notion of intersubjective communication to replace 
Freire’s method of dialogue it is possible to solve the theoretical problems at the 
foundation of Freire’s project. Such a reworking of Freire’s work removes the (at least 
implicit) contradictions that exist in it, and prevent it from falling into the metaphysical 
dilemmas of modern critical theory, as it does while grounded in a subjectivist ontology. 
Such a reconstruction through Habermas of Freire does not undermine its inherent critical 
intent, nor rob it of its transformative quality, rather, it allows for a more direct 
understanding of the possibility and process of social transformation for freedom. Such a 
reconciliation also allows us to move on to Habermas, and incorporate Freire’s project of 
critical pedagogy into Habermas’s critical theory of society, and as such, allows us to 
realize the importance of education (as critical pedagogy) to the possibility of democracy.
A Return to Habermas: From Education to Democracy
While the importance of education to democracy is already posed in Freire’s 
critical pedagogy, no specific model of democracy is posed, and no direct path is clearly 
laid out in this project that allows us to move from education to democracy. By including 
Freire’s work in Habermas’s critical theory of society, such a link becomes direct and 
immediate. Such an inclusion also fills a significant gap in Habermas’s project, namely 
the specific ‘gap’ of a treatment of education as either a process or institution in modem 
society which has deep and important implications for the possibility of democratic
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society. Let me turn, then, to how Freire’s project can be reconciled to Habermas’s in 
order to fill out Habermas’s project and demonstrate this important relationship between 
education and democracy.
Habermas’s critical project has been concerned with reconstructing critical theory 
so that it falls prey to neither metaphysical dilemmas nor to a relativistic denial of the 
modem project. He has based this reconstructed critical theory on the process of 
intersubjective communication, demonstrating how micro-social interaction coordinates 
social activity and the emergence and activity of social institutions. To date, he has 
specifically examined only a few institutions, and in most depth, the processes and 
institution of law as a social institution which has implications upon the possibility of 
democratic society.
Habermas’s examination of law is interested in demonstrating how different 
communicative processes generate the norms which become entrenched in legal 
discourse, and how such legal discourse effects the constitution of society, as either a 
democracy, or some other form of social organization and governance. The institution 
and process of law present an obvious case for Habermas’s project, mainly because of the 
intimate relationship which exists between law and governance, law and social 
organization. However, it is my contention that education, as an institution and process, 
constitutes a perhaps equally central and vital aspect of social organization, and as such, 
requires its own treatment in relation to the possibility of democratic society. And while 
Habermas’s critical theory does not provide such a treatment of education, Freire’s 
critical pedagogy does. By constructing a connection between the work of these two
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thinkers, it is possible to demonstrate this central and vital relationship between 
communication, education and democracy.
Taking Freire’s critical pedagogy as reconstructed using Habermas’s notion of 
intersubjective communication, we can begin to approach a reconciliation of Freire’s 
project to Habermas’s. By adopting intersubjective communication as the foundation of 
Freire’s pedagogical project (as opposed to its existing subjectivist ontological 
grounding), it is possible to match up the trajectories of their critical theory, beginning 
from the micro-social, procedural interactions between subjects and tracing the 
implications of such processes to social organization broadly. Habermas’s project is 
concerned with demonstrating just this, how processes of communication effect social 
organization and constitution. A Habermasian-informed critical pedagogy is likewise 
concerned with how (specifically) educational processes and interactions affect the 
possibility of the constitution of democratic society. Freire’s critical pedagogy, revised to 
take intersubjective communication as its starting point, provides a model of education 
that is based on the processes of communication which take place in education, and 
which demonstrates how these processes of communication affect the possibility of 
critically revealing the possibility of human transformative power, through 
communicatively-coordinated social action. Employing a model of intersubjective 
communication that is communicatively motivated, as in critical pedagogy, offers the 
possibility of coordinating social action for democracy, and would have the 
transformative effect Freire is specifically seeking through his pedagogical project.
On the other hand, if a strategically motivated process of communication is 
employed, as in the banking method, the result would be an undemocratic society, a
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society of domination, the very thing which Freire is critiquing with his work, that which 
he is seeking to change.31 As such, Freire’s revised model of critical pedagogy clearly 
matches up to Habermas’s project. Demonstrating how the communicative interactions 
employed in social processes and institutions affect overall social organization, this 
revised model of critical pedagogy would demonstrate the power of communicative 
interaction to affect democratic socially coordinated action, and would specifically 
demonstrate the importance of education to the possibility of democracy. As such, this 
reconciled model of Freire’s critical pedagogy would not only match up to Habermas’s 
critical social theory, but would also fill a significant gap in his project by demonstrating 
the centrality of education to this possibility of democracy. Clearly a central social 
process and institution in its own right, through this model, it would be possible to argue 
the central importance that specific models of education have for the possibility of 
democracy.
By reconciling Freire’s revised model of critical pedagogy to Habermas’s critical 
theory of society, it is possible to fill the gap left in Habermas’s work by the lack of a 
treatment of education as a central process and institution in society which effects the 
overall intent of his project, namely the possibility of democracy. Making the first 
connection between Habermas and Freire, by reconstruction Freire’s theory in order to 
bringing an intersubjective understanding of communication as the starting point for 
Freire’s pedagogical project, allows a second linkage to be made between Freire’s work
31 There are, however, both legitimate and illegitimate uses o f strategic action, and it will be helpful to draw 
the distinction. For Habermas, illegitimate strategic action occurs specifically when the intentions of the 
action are concealed (as in systematically distorted communication or conscious deception). However, 
legitimate strategic action can occur, so long as it is open, and the intentions behind such action are not 
concealed. Voting is, for example, a form of legitimate strategic action, as opposed to lying, which is 
conscious deception, and therefore illegitimate strategic action. See Habermas, 1984:333, figure 18.
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and Habermas’s project, one which fills out Habermas’s project to include a model and 
analysis of the process of education as vital to the project of social democratization. 
Making these connections between Freire and Habermas, then, provides an important 
new approach to their (now-connected) critical projects, and recognizes the importance of 
education as a central process and institution in society affecting the possibility of 
democracy.
Conclusion: Communication, Education, and Democracy
This, then, is the central argument of this thesis: that education, as a vital process 
and institution to social organization, has important implications for the possibility of 
democratic society. By reconstructing Freire’s project of critical pedagogy through 
Habermas’s critical social theory, focused on the central moment of communication in 
this reconstruction, it is possible to resolve some of the theoretical problems associated 
with Freire’s subjectivist ontology, and to specifically pose critical pedagogy as a 
communicative process and interaction. This reconstruction then allows Freire’s critical 
pedagogy to be used to extend Habermas’s theory of communicative action, 
demonstrating the importance of the interactional process of critical pedagogy in the 
constitution of democracy. That is, we can include Freire’s work to fill out Habermas’s 
project, and provide a treatment of education in Habermas’s critical theory that does not 
presently exist.
Through this argument, it is possible to see how, through the process of 
intersubjective communication, education is intimately linked to the process of 
democratization, and that a critical and communicatively-informed model of education,
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such as Freire’s critical pedagogy, makes important contributions to the possibility of 
democracy.
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